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CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATION OF 
THE RIGHTS OF ETHNIC AND  
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN  
PLURAL DEMOCRACIES:  
LESSONS AND CAUTIONARY TALES  
FROM SOUTH-EAST ASIA 
Li-ann Thio* 
I. MANAGING BABEL1 
An enduring problem for constitutional design and democratic 
practice within the context of a plural society with ethnic, religious 
and linguistic religious minorities is the need to address the fears 
and aspirations of these groups in relation to threats to their 
identity and autonomy.2  It is difficult to secure unity in the face of 
 
* Ph.D. (Cambridge); LL.M (Harvard); B.A. (Hons)(Oxford), Barrister (Gray‟s Inn, 
UK), Professor of Law, National University of Singapore; sometime Member of 
Singapore Parliament (Nominated), (Eleventh Session, 2007-2009).  This article 
builds on a paper presented at the Regional Conference on Constitutional 
Democracy in Africa in the 21st Century: Challenges, Best Practices and 
Opportunities, Nairobi, Kenya, 19-22nd August 2008, convened by the Kenyan 
Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs in collaboration 
with the Institute for Global Engagement. 
 1 LI-ANN THIO, MANAGING BABEL: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION OF 
MINORITIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, at xxvii (2005). (“The gap between the 
ideal of a common humanity and the sober realities of the lack of solidarity among 
groups of human beings is encapsulated in the ancient spectre and symbol of 
„Babel‟.  In Judeo-Christian tradition, the origin of nations and languages is 
traced to Babel where God disrupted the unity of mankind, who then shared a 
common language, by multiplying their tongues.  Messianic prophecy looks 
towards the day when this fracture will be healed and the vision of the universal 
brotherhood of humankind restored and realised.  The traditional test for the 
existence of a nation was that of language, which was considered „an outward sign 
of a group‟s peculiar identity‟.  Babel is deployed here as a metaphor for a 
universalist vision of humanity, which underscores the egalitarian tenets of 
human rights law, but a vision tempered by an appreciation of human history.  
This history is characterised by diversity, conflicting agendas with respect to 
autonomy or control over resources and peoples and in some cases, by ethnic and 
religious hatred, xenophobia and aggressive nationalism which demonises and 
excludes the „Other‟.”).  Id. 
 2 See Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, Annex, U.N. Doc. 
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the disintegrative tendencies of profound ethnic and cultural 
conflict.  Divided societies pose a deep problem for democratic 
government where bare majoritarianism must be qualified by 
counter-majoritarian checks.  It is crucial to nation-building and 
economic development, which facilitates basic standards of living, 
to succeed in the continuing endeavor to resolve inter-group 
conflict which disrupts social stability and fuels separatist 
sentiments. 
To this end, the imposition of a mono-ethnic state on a multi-
ethnic society or a uniform religion on a religiously diverse society 
would be a futile and dangerous route to tread.  This is because 
“[t]hose who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find 
themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of 
opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.”3 
Peace and a just order are integral to a state based on the rule 
of law.  Constitutions play an important, though non-exclusive, 
role in articulating standards, guaranteeing rights, and 
establishing institutions and processes which safeguard normative 
aspirations such as respect for human dignity, ethnic and religious 
diversity and social harmony, political freedoms, and basic 
standards of material welfare.  Added to this is the task of 
structuring a government strong enough to govern and to facilitate 
human welfare and economic development as national priorities. 
Constitutional government informed by the principles of 
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law contribute towards 
the eradication of corruption, political oppression, economic 
privation, and the development of a just system of ordered liberty.4  
This requires a vision of the constitution as a justice-seeking 
instrument rather than merely as a tool for the efficient pursuit of 
 
A/RES/47/135/Annex (Dec. 18, 1992).  Minority concerns usually relate to (1) 
Recognition of Identity and Non-Discrimination; (2) Cultural rights such as 
language rights, educational rights; (3) respect for their religion and traditional 
customs and (4) participation through political representation and in economic 
development. 
 3 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 4 A constitutional system which nurtures constitutionalism would include 
the delimitation of public powers by the Constitution which courts judicially 
enforce, with judicial review being initiated by any party that feels aggrieved by 
law or executive action.  The law must safeguard the equal treatment of all 
persons and the purposes for which discretionary powers are conferred must be 
clearly identified to promote a fair and reasonable exercise of these powers, rather 
than arbitrary exercises. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/2
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public policy and to maintain public order. 5 The function of the 
constitution may include the identification of a national identity or 
shared public values, erecting institutional safeguards to hold 
abuses of power accountable and stipulating processes by which 
legislation and executive action acquire legitimacy.6  Increasingly, 
“the very definition of the state . . . must reflect the ethnic 
diversity of the polity, and acknowledge that the state is an 
aggregation of ethnically and linguistically distinct regions and 
sometimes of several distinct nationalities.”7 
Legal structures are often constructed to respond to a range of 
„harms‟ or „wrongs‟ a vulnerable minority group fears or has 
historically experienced.8  These would include coercive 
assimilation, state endorsed settlement schemes designed to alter 
the dominant regional status of minorities, and the worst-case 
scenario of genocide.9  In the task of nation-building and political 
maturation, there is a dual imperative to secure space for groups 
who wish to preserve their distinct traits and lifestyle and to 
ensure that their individual members enjoy and appreciate the 
equal rights and obligations that attend citizenship in a common 
polity.10  To cohere this polity, the task must be founded on shared 
 
 5 See generally Ruth Gavison, What Belongs in a Constitution, 13 CONST. 
POL. ECON. 89, 89-105 (2002); DONALD S. LUTZ, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DESIGN 17 (2006). 
 6 Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 145-
46 (2003); Richard H. Fallon Jr., Legitimacy in the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. R. 
1787; CARL J. FRIEDRICH, LIMITED GOVERNMENT: A COMPARISON 110 (1974). 
 7 Neelan Tiruchelvam, The Crisis of Constitutionalism: South Asian 
Perspectives, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE 
CONTEMPORARY WORLD 361, 363 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993). 
 8 These may include:  (a) exclusion from public and private sector 
employment opportunities because of language or religious requirements; (b) 
exclusion from high public office; (c) denial of land ownership rights; (d) refusal to 
allow minorities to hold elected office on the basis of language or other 
discriminatory criterion; (e) economic development projects in minority regions 
which benefit the majority instead of the minority; (f) expropriation of traditional 
lands without proper compensation or transmigration policies; (g) refusal to use 
minority language in public schools and administration where warranted by 
substantial numbers of speaks of a minority language; (h) discriminatory denial of 
citizenship rights; and (i) prohibiting minority language and religious practices in 
private. 
 9 See, e.g., THIO, supra note 1, at 129-132; Johannes Morsink, Cultural, 
Genocide, the UDHR and Minority Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 1009 (1999). 
 10 Joel E. Oestrerich, Liberal Theory and Minority Group Rights, 21 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 108 (1999); Allan Rosas, Internal Self-Determination, in MODERN LAW OF 
SELF-DETERMINATION 225-52 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993); WILL KYMLICKA, 
3
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fundamental values and all citizens, whether they belong to a 
majority or minority groups, must have the opportunity to be 
socialized in and to effectively participate in public life, in its 
political, economic and social-cultural dimensions.11 
The vulnerability of racial and religious minorities to 
disadvantage, exclusion, or maltreatment often stems from their 
numerical inferiority and resulting political margin-alization.12  In 
this context, the specter of majoritarian tyranny may arise where 
laws do not apply equally to citizens who are governed instead by 
the pull of ethnic or religious affiliations.13  Unadulterated 
democracy is literally the expressed will of the majority; it is 
“silent on many issues regarding human rights and restraint of 
power.”14  Furthermore, division can be imported where political 
entrepreneurs “prey on parochialism, religion and other similar 
distinctions.”15 
 
MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995). 
 11 The 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action urged the 
promotion of the 1992 UN Declaration on Minorities, urging states to adopt 
appropriate measures which included those which would facilitate minorities in 
their “full participation in all aspects of the political, economic, social, religious 
and cultural life of society and in the economic progress and development in their 
country.” Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, pt. II, ¶¶ 25-27, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993). See also Organization for the Security and 
Cooperation in Europe: High Commissioner on National Minorities, Lund 
Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public 
Life, HCNM.GAL/4/99 (June 30, 1999), available at 
http://www.osce.org/hcnm/23623.html; Krzysztof Drzewicki, Ten Years of the Lund 
Recommendations on the Effectiveness Participation of National Minorities in 
Public Life: Reflections on Progress and Unfinished Business, 16 INT‟L J. ON 
MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 511 (2009). 
 12 Minority group members can be outvoted on matters critical to the survival 
of their community which is a threat not faced by members of majority 
communities since they usually can protect their own interests through their 
control of the state machinery. 
 13 Tiruchelvem, supra note 7, at 362. In the South Asian context, the focus of 
post Independence constitutional discourse shifted from an anti-colonialist 
concern with independence and popular sovereignty to “the need for restraints on 
the majoritarian principle.” Id.  This is because as culturally resurgent majorities 
began to flex their political muscle and deploy legislative and executive power “to 
deny equal treatment to ethnic and cultural minorities, a vote in the hands of an 
intolerant majority was soon viewed as an instrument of oppression.” Id. 
 14 Lawrence W. Beer, Introduction: Constitutionalism in Asia and the United 
States, in CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY ASIA 1, 12 
(Lawrence W. Beer ed., 1992). 
 15 Yash Ghai, The Theory of the State in the Third World and the 
Problematics of Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/2
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Constitutions as a political technology designed to organize 
power, are predicated on a distrust of human nature and a greater 
faith in institutions to channel and restrain power by setting the 
legitimate borders of government action.  As the supreme law of 
the land subject to a special amendment procedure, constitutions 
are designed to be above populist passions, most notably, by 
containing counter-majoritarian checks as a form of a long-term 
pre-commitment strategy framing a constitutional bargain, along 
whose terms a minority group may accede to membership in a new 
polity.  In a sense, this insulates the Good from the vagaries of the 
popular and majoritarian overreaching. 
A constitution may contribute to the pacification of minorities, 
mute ethnic tensions, and promote the peaceful co-existence of 
disparate groups within the state framework by promoting their 
effective protection, recognition, and participation in all aspects of 
public life.  This would include enshrining government structures 
which guarantee minority representation as well as implementing 
modes of accountability which may be activated where minority 
rights and/or concerns are adversely affected.  This may take the 
form of: 
(1) A general individual rights regime based on the norm of non-
discrimination; the focus is on a shared life in the common domain as 
equal citizens. 
(2) Special measures or minority group rights over and above general 
human rights; these may relate to religious, cultural and linguistic 
freedom, educational rights, participatory rights in relation to 
shaping local and national policy, and the right to maintain cross-
frontier contacts with a focus on securing equality. 
(3) Schemes of minority protection which center around positive 
government obligations rather than justiciable rights; these may 
include the creation of separate courts or dispute resolution 
mechanisms to protect cultural practices; affirmative action 
programs or non-territorial forms of autonomy, e.g., equal state 
support to all educational institutions providing basic standards,  set 
and monitored by the state, are met. 
(4) In some cases, particularly where ethnic-religious cleavages are 
territorially based, forms of spatial autonomy such as federalism, 
 
TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 361, 363 (Douglas Greenberg et al. 
eds., 1993). 
5
  
48 PACE INT‟L L. REV. [Vol.  22:1 
confederalism, and confederation16 may be useful methods to adopt 
pursuant to the principle of “internal self-determination.” 17 
Constitutions cannot create social utopias and, as Lutz notes, 
they are “supposed to aid the moving of conflict from the streets 
and the battlefields to arenas of compromise and persuasion, and 
not to produce peace per se.”18 Certain performance criteria by 
which we may evaluate the quality of a „constitutional democracy,‟ 
which does not exist by mere dint of the existence of a 
constitutional text, include: 
(1) A constitution that is followed rather than ignored; 
(2) A constitution based on and supportive of the rule of law; 
(3) Free elections involving essentially all of the adult population; 
(4) Two or more competitive parties; and 
(5) At least one peaceful transfer of power between competitive 
parties or between significantly different party coalitions, through 
the free electoral process, or else confidence that an electoral outcome 
that would replace the currently dominant party or party coalition 
would be accepted peacefully.19 
At the end of the day, it is not merely the form of 
constitutional government that is important; rather, the 
constitutional culture or ethos of tolerance and mutual respect are 
important in maintaining social peace.  A plural society or 
community that desires peace and an integrated society must set 
its face against ethnic and religious hatred and aggressive 
nationalism which demonizes and excludes the „Other‟.  It must 
both honor and give expression to a constitutional culture 
 
 16 This involves two elements: first, power-sharing, which “denotes the 
participation of representatives of all significant communal groups in political 
decision making, especially at the executive level;” second, group autonomy 
entails giving groups “authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in the 
areas of education and culture.” Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided 
Societies, 15 J. DEMOC. 96, 97 (2004), available at 
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/ACROBAT/stm103.%20 
articles/lijphart%20Constitutional_Design.pdf.%20articles/lijphart%20Constitutio
nal_Design.pdf. 
 17 THIO, supra note 1, at 19. 
 18 Donald Lutz, Thinking About Constitutionalism at the Start of the Twenty-
First Century, 30 PUBLIUS 115, 125 (2000). 
 19 Id. at 119. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/2
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respectful of human and group rights and committed to sustaining 
ethnic-religious pluralism within the national order. Beyond rule-
following and legalism, attention must be paid to the quality of 
constitutional norms and the public values espoused.  Only then 
can a true spirit of inclusive fraternity displace the wry 
observation that “if all men are brothers, the ruling model is Cain 
and Abel.”20 
This article seeks to set out principles to optimize the 
constitutional accommodation of ethnic and religious minorities in 
plural societies committed to constitutional democracy.  It draws 
from international standards and the lessons of best and worst 
practices which may be gleaned from the constitutional practice of 
various South-East Asian constitutional orders whose societies are 
racially and religiously diverse.  A key idea is that a well-
functioning civil society is not nurtured by enforced uniformity, but 
by tolerance and mutual respect for different racial and religious 
groups.  If members of a politically non-dominant minority group 
feel protected by laws and legal processes, and if citizenship is 
inclusive, this will solidify their commitment to the state and 
enable them to focus on what is shared, rather than what divides, 
in cultivating a sense of common citizenship. 
Constitutions speak to the economic, political, and social 
dimensions of state-society relations, both constituting and being 
constituted by these ground-level realities.  Items on the menu of 
options, which may inform a constitutional minority protection 
scheme pursuant to preserving the multi-ethnic character of the 
polity, include individual rights relating to religious freedom and 
equal protection clauses, special group rights such as linguistic or 
cultural rights, permanent affirmative action programs to equalize 
opportunities, pluralism, forms of secularism, and power-sharing 
schemes.21  The protection of religious freedom and the linguistic 
and cultural traits of minorities are not optional extras but are 
essential to the workings of constitutional democracy in a plural 
society.  The denial of human rights flows from undemocratic, 
 
 20 Arthur Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 
1249. 
 21 Such schemes could go beyond the elected branch of government to include 
the civil service, judiciary, police, and military, e.g., through specifying ethnic 
quotas or through a broad constitutional provision an favoring the general 
objective of broad representation, which the government can be charged with 
practically implementing. 
7
  
50 PACE INT‟L L. REV. [Vol.  22:1 
authoritarian rule and an absence of constitutionalism.  Thus, all 
sectors of society should have a role in the making of the 
constitution and its practical operation through the legal 
techniques of rights, duties to consult in forming policies which 
affect minority interests, legislative oversight bodies and agencies 
able to receive complaints about minority abuses in order to 
investigate these complaints, and remedial mechanisms to correct 
such abuses.  This buttresses the legitimacy and durability of the 
constitution where stakeholders have a role in its formation and 
subsequent operation.  This would also include the ability to 
activate a sufficiently muscular checks and balances scheme and to 
have effective formal and informal channels to shape the 
legislative agenda.  An optimal balance must be sought between 
recognizing minority status, permitting some degree of self-
government, and integration with society at large.  This could 
include: 
(1) Measures to ensure effective participation in national 
government, including the allocation of resources to autonomous 
areas; 
(2) Measures to encourage power-sharing in deeply divided societies 
and those with many different ethnic or other groups; 
(3) Measures to ensure appropriate communal balance in law 
enforcement, including recruitment to the police, the army and the 
judiciary; and 
(4) Measures to ensure fair participation of members of minorities in 
mainstream economic activity, including employment in the public 
and major private sectors.22 
II. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH – REMEDIAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATION AND 
CONFLICT PREVENTION) 
A. The Internal North-South Divide: When Economic 
 
 22 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Danish Centre for Human Rights, 
Working Group on Minorities, 8th session, Report of an International Seminar on 
Autonomist and Integrationist Approaches to Minority Protection, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2002/WP.1 (Apr. 3-4, 2002). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/2
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Underdevelopment Correlates with Racial-Religious Minorities 
A crucial component to political stability is healthy economic 
growth.  It requires a rule of law-based state to facilitate legal 
certainty and stability, and is integral to attracting foreign 
investment and trade, and to underpinning financial services and 
commerce.  Following from this, one clear source of social agitation 
is where there is an inequitable distribution of economic fruits 
between the core-periphery, in relation to resource management 
and profit allocation. 
For example, previously, the Indonesian government with its 
center in the Javanese center of Jakarta did not fairly share 
revenue with the province of Aceh in Sumatra derived from the 
province‟s considerable forestry, gas, and oil resources, which 
constituted 11% to 15% of Indonesia‟s total export earnings.23  Of 
this, only 5% was returned to Aceh through development subsidies, 
perpetuating the state of under-development through such uneven 
investment flows and exploitative economic policies.24  This was 
addressed by the Special Autonomy Law on Nanggroe Acheh 
Darussalam (Law No. 18 of 2001), which effects a redistribution of 
revenue whereby Aceh is to receive 70% of oil revenues rather than 
the current 5% and 80% of the agricultural and fishing revenues.25  
Legislation, by effecting redistributive justice, promotes peaceful 
co-existence and empowers minority groups to realize their right of 
internal self-determination.  Social justice and development is an 
integral aspect of the peace architecture. 
Ethnic conflict aggravated by economic disparity between the 
core and periphery may be compounded by a sense of historical 
grievance and a desire fueled by a resurgent religious fervor which 
translates into a political movement to place a different social 
system on a formal legal basis, such as the desire to impose hudud 
law in Aceh.26  This is exacerbated when a dominant majority tries 
 
 23 Li-ann Thio, International Law and Secession in the Asia-Pacific Region, in 
SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 297-354, 322 (Marcelo G. Kohen 
ed., 2006). 
 24 Id. at 322. 
 25 Mega Offers Aceh More Autonomy, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Aug. 16, 2001, at 
4. 
 26 The Achinese constitute 90% of the population in Sumatra and take pride 
in their distinct 400 year history as an important Islamic sultanate before coming 
under the control of the Dutch East Indies colonies. ANTHONY SMITH, ACEH, SELF 
9
  
52 PACE INT‟L L. REV. [Vol.  22:1 
to impose its language and culture to coercively assimilate a non-
dominant minority.  For example, attempts to impose the Thai 
language and Buddhist culture on the Pattani Malay in South 
Thailand have fueled calls by the Pattani United Liberation Front 
for a separate Islamic territory.27  This resistance to “Siamisation” 
is com-pounded by a sense of regional grievance that stems from 
the under-developed nature of southern Thailand relative to the 
rest of the country.  The exacerbation of socio-economic cleavages 
and the economic “north-south” divided by racial-religious 
differentiation also shapes the character of the Mindanao question 
in south Philippines.  This economically under-developed region 
which is plagued by violence, fueling insecurity, sustains 
separatist sentiment.28  Various separ-atists groups such as the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (“MILF”) have been raging a bloody 
separatist war since 1978 for an independent Islamic state in 
Mindanao, which is rich in minerals.29  The Muslim Moros, who 
make up 5% of the Philippines‟ eighty-two million population, 
nurse a sense of grievance, united by a strong ethnic or religious 
identity, against the majority Catholic Filipinos, fearing the 
weakening of their religious-cultural traditions through coercive 
assimilationist measures, as well as a dilution of their numbers 
through Catholic transmigration.30  Attempts at concluding peace 
 
DETERMINATION CONFLICT PROFILE, FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS (2002), 
http://selfdetermine.irc-online.org/conflicts/aceh.html. 
 27 Kazi Mahmood, Thailand Perpetuating the Taming of Islam in Patani 
(2002), available at http://www.islamonline.net/English/Views/200203/article 
9.shtml. 
 28 See Astrid S. Tuminez, The Past Is Always the Present: The Moros of 
Mindanao and the Quest for Peace, (Southeast Asia Research Ctr., Working Paper 
Series No. 99, 2008), available at www.cseas.niu.edu/PhilAccess/ 
Tuminez_Mindanao%20Conflict.pdf. 
 29 J.D. Appleton et al., Mercury Contamination Associated with Artisanal 
Gold mining on the Island of Mindanao, the Philippines, 228 SCI. TOTAL ENV‟T 95 
(1999); William N. Holden & Daniel R. Jacobson, Ecclesial Opposition to Mining 
on Mindanao: Neoliberalism Encounters the Church of the Poor in the Land of 
Promise, in 11WORLDVIEWS: GLOBAL RELIGIONS, CULTURE & ECOLOGY 155 (2007), 
available at http://www.ingentaconnect.com/ 
content/brill/wov;jsessionid=1bbnj97lq3c3c.alice; Salvatore Schavo-Campo & Mary 
Judd, The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Roots, Costs and Potential Peace 
Dividend (World Bank Social Development Papers, Conflict Prevention and 
Reconstruction Paper No. 24, 2005). 
 30 Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, Options in the Pursuit of a Just, Comprehensive 
and Stable Peace in the Southern Philippines, 41 ASIAN SURVEY 271 (2001). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/2
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agreements have not been wholly successful.31  The resulting 
threat to the indivisibility of the state and the lack of peace has 
scared off investors, leaving the region mired in poverty.32 
Thus, “internal colonialism”33 undermines the enjoyment of 
“internal self-determination.”34  In such cases, conflict pre-vention 
may be achieved through devising constitutional schemes to 
facilitate national reconciliation by accommodating demands for 
autonomy through protecting group rights and devising 
decentralized forms of government which balances the needs of the 
province with those of the center.  Relevant factors that should 
inform this task would include: 
(1) Establishing a democratic political system; 
(2) Training an efficient and non-corrupt bureaucracy able to 
effectively devise and implement policy; and 
(3) Sufficiently empowering provincial government to discharge the 
tasks of government through a genuine transfer of political authority 
and resources from the centre and to bring about progressive socio-
economic change to eradicate poverty.35 
Poor governance, funding deficits, and a lack of broad-based 
support can scuttle autonomy experiments, as in the case of 
Muslim Mindanao.36  The constitutional regime established by the 
1987 People‟s Constitution provides for the creation of autonomous 
regimes in Muslim Mindanao (“ARMM”) “within the framework of 
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial 
 
 31 Abhoud Syed M. Lingga, Rethinking State Policies and Minority Rights: 
Getting the Mindanao Peace Process Moving, Institute of Bangsamoro Studies 
(Occasional Paper No. 2008-02, June 2008), available at http:// 
library.upmin.edu.ph/philmin/bangsamoro/IBS%20Occasional%20Paper%202008-
02%20-%20Lingga.pdf. 
 32 Daniel Joseph Ringuet, The Continuation of Civil Unrest and Poverty in 
Mindanao, 24 CONTEMP. SE. 33 (2002). 
 33 M. Sornarajah, Internal Colonialism and Humanitarian Intervention, 11 
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 45 (1981). 
 34 Internal self determination may be understood as an umbrella term 
relating to minority rights and political participation rights.  ANTONIO CASSESE, 
SELF DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL APPRAISAL 348-55 (1995). 
 35 RUTH LAPIDOTH, AUTONOMY: FLEXIBLE SOLUTIONS TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS 
(1996); AUTONOMY AND ETHNICITY: NEGOTIATING COMPETING CLAIMS IN MULTI-
ETHNIC STATES (Yash P. Ghai ed., 2000). 
 36 SCHIAVO-CAMPO & MARY JUDD, supra note 29. 
11
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integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”37 The Constitution 
also empowers the Congress of the Philippines to create organic 
acts for each region which provides “for special courts with 
personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the 
provisions of this Constitution and national laws.”38  The ARMM 
currently composes six provinces. 39 
The Moro National Liberation Front (“MNLF”), one of the chief 
secessionist groups, refused to recognize the ARMM.40  Under the 
terms of a 1996 accord, the Autonomous Region of Muslim 
Mindanao was established, as was the Southern Philippines 
Council for Peace and Development, to replace the provisional 
government chaired by MNLF leader, Nur Misuari.41  A splinter 
MNLF group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (“MILF”), rejected 
this plan and fighting resumed in 2001 after Misuari was ousted 
on corruption charges.42  It is clear that economic development 
plans play an important role in stabilizing states.  While peace and 
development efforts are currently being pursued by the Arroyo 
administration, this is itself disrupted and hindered by armed 
separatist struggles led by the MILF43 and Abu Sayyaff.  The 
MILF seeks the creation of a separate Islamic state.44  The 
continuing state of instability and civil strife undoubtedly hampers 
the development of the region, which is integral to the pacification 
of minority concerns and the vindication of minority interests. 
. 
 
 37 CONST. (1987), Art. X, (Phil.), available at http://www.chanrobles.com/ 
article10autonomousregions.htm. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See generally ASIAN INST. OF JOURNALISM AND COMMC‟N, WEBSITE ON 
MUSLIM MINDANAO FOR JOURNALISTS AND OTHER COMMUNICATORS, History of 
ARMM (2008), http://www.muslimmindanao.ph/armm.html (last visited Jan. 14, 
2010). 
 40 THIO, supra note 23, at 333. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Li-ann Thio, International Law and Secession in the Asia and Pacific 
Regions, in INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 297, 333-34 (Marcelo G. Kohen ed., 
2007). 
 43 Soliman M. Santos, Peacetalk: End in Sight?, MINDA NEWS, Sept. 24, 2008, 
http://www.mindanews.com/index.php?option=com_content.&task=view 
&id=5206&Itemid=266. 
 44 See generally ANGEL RABASA & PETER CHALK, INDONESIA‟S TRANSFORMATION 
AND THE STABILITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (Rand 2001) 87 (2001), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1344/ 
MR1344.ch9.pdf. 
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B. Transforming Constitutions to Address Ethnic Tensions in 
Divided Societies45 from Integration to Autonomy 
The special autonomy scheme for Aceh, constructed to operate 
within the unitary framework of Indonesia, is instructive.46  In 
adopting this scheme, the central government marked a shift from 
a policy of repressing ethno-nationalist groups towards satisfying 
their ethnic-based demands for accommodation.  This required an 
ideological shift from an integrationist philosophy of state which 
focused on the consolidation and centralization of government 
power which had, incidentally, been adopted as a unifying anti-
colonial strategy.  The scheme had mutated into the non-
recognition and brutal, systematic military suppression of 
separatist movements, such as the Free Aceh Movement, which 
was formed in the 1970s.  This produced regional instability. 
Indonesia began to democratize after 1998 when authoritarian 
strongman, President Suharto, was removed from office.  In the 
face of demands for decentralization in a country with some fifty 
ethnic groups, steps were taken to inject more flexibility into the 
organicist47 political system to address these ethno-nationalist 
demands, through regional autonomy laws.48  This espoused a 
unifying Indonesian nationalism and the downplaying of cultural 
 
 45 Lijphart, supra note 11, at 99-106. Among the prescribed forms are 
elections by proportional representation, parliamentary government, power-
sharing at cabinet level in ethnic terms, a head of state elected by parliament or 
whose office is combined with the prime minister's, federalism and 
decentralization, publicly funded autonomous schools. 
 46 Originally, the plan was for Indonesia to have a federal structure but this 
was abandoned in favor of a unitary state by 1950. A fear related to a federal 
structure is that it might weaken the central government and serve as a prelude 
to secessionist claims. 
 47 This has been defined by Supomo, the main architect of the 1945 
Independence Constitution as “a theory in which the state was committed not to 
individual rights or particular classes but to society conceived as an organic 
whole.” Jacques Bertrand, Indonesia‟s Quasi-Federalist Approach: 
Accommodation Amid Strong Integrationist Tendencies, 5 INT‟L. J. CONST. L. 576, 
580 (Oct. 2007) (quoting David Bourchier, Totalitarianism and the “National 
Personality”: Recent Controversy About the Philosophical Basis of the Indonesian 
State, in IMAGINING INDONESIA: CULTURAL POLITICS AND POLITICAL CULTURE 161 
(Barbara Martin-Schiller & James William Schiller eds., 1997)).  As such the 
Constitution did not provide for the special representation for particular regions 
or ethnic groups in enshrining the principle of the unitary state and forbidding 
the designation of any subdivision as “states”. 
 48 REGIONALISM IN POST-SUHARTO INDONESIA (Maribeth Erb et al. eds., 2005). 
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differences through a common language (Malay) and the Pancasila 
philosophy (five principles of state) which affirmed, non-
specifically, a “belief in (one) God”.49  This form of secular 
nationalism rejected the Islamist desire to identify Islam as the 
official state religion.50  Regional resistance to the central 
government stems from disillusionment with the centralization of 
political power, its failure to fairly distribute the gains of natural 
resources exploitation, and the military repression of groups like 
the Acehnese pursuant to preserving the unitary orientation of the 
state.51 
C. Representation of Regions in Central Government: Power-
Sharing 
Since 1998, there have been institutional changes, reflecting a 
shift from an integrationist to accommodationist approach: 
“integration favours a single identity that is coterminous with the 
state; accommodation on the other hand leads to flexible legal 
arrangements that recognise and empower ethnic diversity in a 
variety of ways.”52 
Integrationists consider that stability is yielded where cultural 
diversities are relegated to the private realm in institutional 
terms, while in the public realm, equal citizenship rights are 
recognized.53 This is individualist in orientation. Conversely, 
accomodationists argue that group differences remain relatively 
inflexible in many circumstances and that integration will thus 
produce instability. 54 Sounder strategies lie in fostering 
accommodation through pluralist federation, consociation, and 
multi-cultural policies. 
Commentators note the institutional changes have been “near 
 
 49 Article 29(1) of the Indonesian Constitution states: “The state shall be 
based upon belief in one god.” INDON. CONST.  [UUD '45] art. 29(1), available at 
http://www.embassyof indonesia.org/about/pdf/IndonesianConstitution.pdf. 
 50 This would have alienated Christian groups from joining the nationalist 
movement against the Dutch. 
 51 THIO, supra note 23, at 322. 
 52 Bertrand, supra note 47, at 580. 
 53 Henry J Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle for Autonomy 
Regimes for Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1542 (1991). 
 54 Id. at 1542. 
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revolutionary.”55  One of the changes included a constitutional 
amendment to respect the “diversity of regions”56 and to provide for 
autonomy and transfer of competences, except for matters left to 
the federal government such as foreign policy, defense, security, 
justice, monetary and fiscal policy, as well as religion. 57  In 
addition, regions are now represented in the Regional 
Representative Council, a separate legislative chamber, which is 
considered primarily consultative in nature.58 Thus, regions now 
have a dedicated institution in which they are represented in the 
central government. 
D. Special Laws for Provinces and the Institutionalization of 
Autonomy: The Aceh Example – More Equitable Resource Sharing 
and Control Powers; Detailed Powers of Regional Government 
In relation to Aceh, the government adopted various pieces of 
special legislation to effectuate this, which appears to have 
produced a higher degree of stability, the latest being Law No. 11 
of 2006 (with 210 articles),59 which supersedes earlier laws.  The 
latest legislation has been more successful as it has addressed 
matters, such as fiscal issues, with greater specificity than past 
laws.  The July 2001 Special Autonomy Law (which has thirty-four 
articles) provides that Aceh should receive 70% of the oil revenue 
rather than merely 5% and 80% of the agriculture and fisheries 
revenue.60  This seeks to integrate the province into national 
 
 55 Bertrand, supra note 47,at 592. 
 56  INDON. CONST. [UUD '45] arts. 18, 18A-B. 
 57 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 32 Tahun 2004 Tentang 
Pemerintahan Daerah [Law No. 32, 2004 of the Republic of Indonesia on Regional 
Government], arts. 1-3, 10-18. 
 58 Bertrand, supra note 47, at 593. Each province has the same number of 
representatives, irrespective of size, and the Regional Representative Council has 
the power to propose legislation to the People‟s Representative Assembly and 
participate in discussing bills, as well as to oversee region-specific laws. Id. 
 59 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND THE FREE ACEH MOVEMENT (Aug. 15, 2005), 
http://www.aceh-mm.org/download/english/Helsinki%.  This emerged from the 
Helsinki Memorandum of understanding signed between the Indonesian 
government and the Free Aceh Movement on August 15, 2005.  This specifically 
allows the Free Aceh Movement combatants to disband and transform into a 
political organization. Id. 
 60 This was not entirely satisfactory since the central government retained 
the power to calculate the amounts, collect taxes and transmit revenues to the 
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society by addressing deep-rooted grievances.  In addition, the root 
causes of ethnic conflict tension may be traceable to the exclusion 
of Acehnese language in many public institutions, under-
representation of Acehnese in public life and disadvantageous land 
policies. 
Under Law No. 11 of 2006,61 Indonesia, while not embracing a 
federalist structure, has sought to stabilize its polity through 
“quasi-federal forms” while preserving an overall integrationist 
tone towards managing ethnic differences  as well as the form of a 
unitary state.  This is accomplished by devolving more localized 
administrative powers and increasing the percentage of fiscal 
resources to be retained locally.  In addition, the central 
government is under a duty to consult the province with respect to 
decisions affecting the region. To remedy the vagueness in the 
2001 Law, the 2006 Law sets out more clearly and in specific detail 
the powers of the governor as well as a removal mechanism, those 
of the Aceh legislature which have been given greater oversight 
powers in relation to corruption, and the obligations of the Aceh 
government to provide social services and the electoral process for 
the governor and regency heads.62  Under the 2001 Law, the Aceh 
police was a branch of the Indonesian National Police and the 
governor only had a weak consultative role in the appointment of 
police chief; under the 2006 Law, the Aceh government has 
stronger oversight powers over security forces.  For example, the 
 
provinces.  The 2001 Law provided that for 8 years, Aceh government would get 
80% share of tax revenues from forestry, mining and fisheries with 55% oil 
revenues and 40% gas revenues going to the province, After eight years, this 
would be reduce to 35% oil revenues and 20% gas revenues.  Bertrand, supra note 
47, at 600-01. 
 61 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 11 Tahun 2006 Tentang 
Pemerintahan Aceh [Law No. 11, 2006 of the Republic of Indonesia on Aceh 
Government], available at http://www.bra-aceh.org/download/archive/loga/ 
loga_law_on_the_governing_of_aceh_english_version.pdf. This can be modified by 
the Indonesian Parliament, but since it specifies that the Aceh Parliament must 
review and approval any Aceh-specific legislation from the Indonesian 
Parliament, it opens the door to challenging national legislation in courts. An 
unofficial translation is available at www.unorc.or.id/file/ 
download_up.php?f=301.pdf. 
 62 Law No. 11/2006, arts. 223, 256 (2006) (Indon.), on the Governing of Aceh 
with Explanatory Notes, translated by United States Agency for International 
Development [USAID], available at http://www.bra-
aceh.org/download/archive/loga/loga_law_on_the_governing_of_aceh_english_versi
on.pdf. 
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governor and legislature must be consulted and must give their 
approval to a candidate for the Aceh chief of police and the Law 
requires the military to respect human rights and local customs 
which is unprecedented insofar as no regional legislature has ever 
had legislative power to restrict military forces.63  The Law seeks 
to pacify grievances and provide some kind of accountability for 
military wrongdoings by providing for a truth and reconciliation 
commission to investigate past armed forces abuses.64 
In addition, the 2006 Law provides an even greater share of 
resources than the 2001 Law, including 70% of oil and gas 
revenues from the state‟s share of income in these resources, and 
80% of revenues from other provincial resources.  The method of 
calculating these revenues is more specific, in order to mitigate 
manipulation and deal with past perceptions that the central 
government was retaining more than its fair share of total 
revenues.65  In addition, the Aceh government now enjoys the 
authority to administer all natural resources, which is “an 
unprecedented delegation of powers over revenues.”66 
The province of Aceh has been awarded two significant special 
exceptions from the general law of the land.  First, local political 
parties have the right to organize, and do not need to have a 
national outlook as is required elsewhere in Indonesia.67 Second, as 
a special concession to Aceh, religion falls within its provincial 
jurisdiction, whereas it is a matter falling within the jurisdiction of 
the central government for the rest of the country.68 
These legal developments have given Aceh province a clearer 
legal basis for implementing Islamic law in a comprehensive 
manner,69 although the central government retains some measure 
 
 63 Id. arts. 202-03, at 83.  
 64 Bertrand, supra note 47, at 603. 
 65 Id. at 602. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Ben Hillman, Bullets to Ballots: Aceh in 2009, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 4, 
2009, http://www.feer.com/essays/2009/december51/bullets-to-ballots-aceh-in-
2009; Irwandi Yusuf, Elections Must be Peaceful in Aceh, JAKARTA POST, Feb. 21 
2009, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/02/21/elections-must-be-peaceful-
aceh.html . 
 68 Katie Hamann, Aceh Province Legislators Vote to Impose Stricter Sharia 
Law, VOANEWS.COM, Sept. 15, 2009, http://www1.voanews.com/ english/news/a-
13-2009-09-15-voa9-68709782.html. 
 69 This includes implementing the law relating to human relationships which 
may address the sale and purchase of goods, banking, borrowing money, 
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of control, for example, by appointing religious court Justices.70  
Aside from according broader competence to the Islamic courts of 
justice, the new institution of the Wilayatul Hisbah (syariah police) 
has been established; it is tasked with overseeing Islamic 
regulations on dress, alcohol, gambling, and “immoral acts,” but 
has no powers of arrest.71  There have been concerns that Aceh is a 
“pilot project” for those who wish Indonesia to jettison its secular 
foundations and replace it with an Islamic state, which would be 
oppressive to non-Muslims as well as moderate Muslims.72 
It appears that the recalibration of center-periphery powers 
through autonomy laws, which qualifies the integrationist 
approach, has eased tensions between the provinces and the 
central government.  However, its longevity remains to be seen. 
E. Privileged Treatment and the Problems of Perpetuation – 
Bumiputera Policy 
A cautionary tale may be gleaned from the Malaysian context, 
where the legal system is based on the Westminster model of 
parliamentary government.73  The Federal Constitution of 
Malaysia, adopted in 1957 after a period of Anglo-Malayan 
negotiations, constitutionalized economic and other privileges for 
the majority Malays and other indigenous groups falling with the 
category of “bumiputera” (sons of the soil).74  This provision was 
 
mortgages, mining, establishment of companies, regulating human labour: Under 
Article 39 of Qanun No. 10/2002, the Islamic courts of justice can decide such 
related matters beyond personal and family law. 
 70 Hasnil Basri Siregar, Islamic Law in a National Legal System: A Study on 
the Implementation of Shari‟ah in Aceh, 3 ASIAN J. COMP. L., art. 4 (2008), 
available at http://www.bepress.com/asjcl/vol3/iss1/art4/. 
 71 There have been clashes with the secular security forces, e.g., over a dance 
at a cultural event which the syariah police considered “did not reflect the Islamic 
atmosphere and should be stopped instantly”: Aceh Forces Clash over Dance, 
STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Aug. 9, 2008, at C5. 
 72 Ana Gomes, Op-Ed. & Comment., Aceh‟s Harsh Islamic Law is an Ominous 
Sign-Int‟l Herald Trib., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2006, available at 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/09/13/opinion/edgomes.php. 
 73 Deborah A Johnson & Anthony Milner, 'Westminster Implanted: The 
Malaysian Experience', in WESTMINSTER LEGACIES: DEMOCRACY AND 
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (Haig Patapan et al. eds., 
2005). 
 74 Jaclyn Ling-Chien Neo, Malay Nationalism, Islamic Supremacy and the 
Constitutional Bargain in the Multi-ethnic Composition of Malaysia, 13 INT'L J. ON 
MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 95 (2006). 
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designed to assuage fears of the Malays who constitute some 54% 
of the population75 in relation to the economic dominance of the 
Chinese minority community. 
Former Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, in speaking of the 
Malaysian power-sharing model, described the priority in the post-
Independence era when Malaysia was “an ethnic time bomb 
waiting to explode,” of implementing an inclusive approach, which 
empowered all ethnic and religious groups by giving them a 
collective stake in decision-making.  Part of this social contract, 
enshrined within the Constitution, was: 
 
[T]he agreement by the indigenous peoples to grant citizenship to 
the immigrant Chinese and Indian communities.  This changed the 
character of the nation, from one that originally belonged to the 
indigenous peoples to one that Chinese and Indian citizens could 
also call their own.  Chinese and Indians now share political power 
with the Malays and sit in the Federal Cabinet and State 
Executive Councils. In return for being granted these political 
rights, the immigrant communities agreed to special economic 
privileges for the indigenous peoples, given their disadvantaged 
position.  This constitutes the political, economic, legal and moral 
foundation for the distributive justice policies of the country. 76 
 
 In addition, Malay was constitutionally recognized as the 
national language, and Islam as the official religion of the 
Federation.  Under Article 153(1) of the Federal Constitution of 
Malaysia,77 the head of state or Yang di Pertuan Agong (King) is 
obliged to “safeguard the special position of the Malays and natives 
of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and the legitimate 
 
 75 See generally JOSHUA CASTELLINO & ELVIRA DOMÍNGUEZ REDONDO, 
MINORITY RIGHTS IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS ch. 4 (2006). Chinese 
represent about 25% of the population, Indians about 8%, and indigenous groups 
about 12 percent. Id. 
 76 H.E. Dato' Seri Abdullah Haji Ahmad Badawi, Prime Minister Malay., 
Keynote Address at Asia Media Summit: The Challenges of Multireligious, 
Multiethnic and Multicultural Societies, ¶¶ 20-21 (Apr. 19, 2004), available at 
http://www.un.int/malaysia/PM%20Statement/PM041904.htm. 
 77 MALAY. CONST. art. 153(1).  These special privileges were a continuation of 
those enjoyed by the Malays, which the British had recognized in treaties they 
entered into with Malay sultans. Thus, this created in the Malay mind a sense 
that Malaysia belongs to Malays and the privileges were their entitlement by 
birthright. 
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interests of other communities . . . .”78  Pursuant to this, special 
provisions may include reserving public service positions, 
scholarships, educational and training privileges, and licenses for 
trade and business, as required by federal law for Malays and 
natives of Sabah and Sarawak.79 
It is true that economic disparity between the wealthy Chinese 
minority and the Malay majority is a cause of social tension.  The 
effect of this regime of privileged treatment, however, is that it is 
both under and over-inclusive, given its avowed purpose of 
equalizing or minimizing social-economic disparities.80  Starkly 
put, it is because such privileged treatment excludes poor Chinese 
and rich Malays.  A more holistic policy of distributive justice 
would be means-oriented rather than race-oriented.  In addition, 
this affirmative action program for the majority has bred a 
dependency or entitlement mentality amongst the privileged 
communities.81  Article 153 has been invoked to support Ketuanan 
Melayu, the Malay supremacy nationalist belief that the Malays 
are the lords of Malaysia, as opposed to a non-racist conception of a 
 
 78 Malaysia has an ethnically plural composition: Malays account for 54.1% 
and other Bumiputeras account for 11.8% of the total population; the Chinese 
account for 25.3% of the population and the Indians, 7.7%. SAW SWEE-HOCK, THE 
POPULATION OF MALAYSIA 71 (2007). 
 79 MALAY. CONST. art. 161A(6)-(7). “Natives” are defined in article 161A as 
meaning (a) in relation to Sarawak, a person who is a citizen and either belongs to 
one of the races specified in Clause (7) as indigenous to the State or is of mixed 
blood deriving exclusively from those races; and (b) in relation to Sabah, a person 
who is a citizen, is the child or grandchild of a person of a race indigenous to 
Sabah, and was born (whether on or after Malaysia Day or not) either in Sabah or 
to a father domiciled in Sabah at the time of the birth.  Clause (7) provides that 
the races to be treated for the purposes of the definition of "native" in Clause (6) 
as indigenous to Sarawak are the Bukitans, Bisayahs, Dusuns, Sea Dayaks, Land 
Dayaks, Kadayans, Kalabit, Kayans, Kenyags (Including Sabups and Sipengs), 
Kajangs (including Sekapans,. Kejamans, Lahanans, Punans, Tanjongs dan 
Kanowits), Lugats, Lisums, Malays, Melanos, Muruts, Penans, Sians, Tagals, 
Tabuns and Ukits.  Notably, this definition excludes indigenous people such as 
the Orang Asli on Peninsula Malaysia. Id. 
 80 Huang Thio Su Mien, Constitutional Discrimination Under the Malaysian 
Constitution, 6 MALAY. L. REV. 1 (1964). 
 81 M. BAKRI MUSA, THE MALAY DILEMMA REVISITED - RACE DYNAMICS IN 
MODERN MALAYSIA (1999); THOMAS SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AROUND THE 
WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 55-77 (2004); Nazry Bahwari, Will Malaysia Ever be 
Colour-Blind?, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Malay.), Nov. 16, 2009, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/nov/16/malaysia-race/print; PETER 
WOOD, CLIENTAGE AND CONTUMELY: HOW GROUP PREFERENCES FOSTER 
DEPENDENCY AND RESENTMENT 275, 275-87 (2008). 
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Malaysian Malaysia.  Although Article 153 was drafted as a 
temporary provision,82 it is today seditious to discuss its repeal and 
the special rights of Malays in all political, social and economic 
spheres.83 Critics further argue that government policy such as the 
National Economic Policy (“NEP”) is constitutionally ultra vires.84  
The NEP sought to correct economic imbalance and eradicate 
poverty.85  Some measures pursuant to this involved giving 
bumiputera real estate at discounts of 5% to 15% and adopting 
regulations setting a minimum equity holding for bumiputera.86  It 
set the target of transferring 30% of the nation‟s wealth to Malays 
by 1990.87 
The NEP has apparently created a Malay middle class which 
its supporters argue has averted social conflicts and a return to the 
racial riots of the past.88  Indeed, Malay politicians have been 
known to say that if minorities were unhappy with the status quo, 
they could return to India or China; one even declared that if 
Malay privileges were taken away, there would be „„blood flowing 
in the streets.”89 
Critics allege that the unfortunate side-effects90 of the policy 
include corruption in the award of government contracts and open 
 
 82 The Reid Commission, which drafted the Merdeka Constitution, agreed 
that the privileges should continue for some fifteen to twenty years unless 
Parliament provided otherwise.  The Alliance parties, including the governing 
UMNO party, agreed for a review of the position fifteen years after Independence 
in an oral communication which was omitted from the Alliance memorandum for 
reasons of political sensitivity. See JOSEPH M. FERNANDO, MONOGRAPH NO. 31, THE 
MAKING OF THE MALAYAN CONSTITUTION 85-86 (2002). 
 83 Pub. Prosecutor v. Ooi Kee Saik, [1971] 2 M.L.J. 108 (Malay.); Fan Yew 
Teng v. Pub. Prosecutor, [1975] 2 M.L.J. 235 (Malay.). 
 84 Mohammad Rizal Salim & Zalina Abdul Halim, The Boundaries of Law: A 
Socio-Legal Perspective of Malaysia's Economic Policy, 8 GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES 
1 (2008), available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol8/ iss2/art7. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id.; see also R Rasiah & I Shari, Market, Government and Malaysia's New 
Economic Policy, 25 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 57-78 (2001). 
 87 Ho Khai Leong, Dynamics of Policy-Making in Malaysia: The Formulation 
of the New Economic Policy and the National Development Policy, 14 ASIAN J. PUB. 
ADMIN. 204-227 (1992), available at sunzi1. lib.hku.hk/hkjo/view/50/5000368.pdf. 
 88 See Rizal Salim & Abdul Halim, supra note 84. 
 89 James Chin, Malaysia‟s Broad Mix Still Waiting to Merge Happily, 
CANBERRA TIMES, July 11, 2008, available at http://www.canberratimes.com. 
au/news/opinion/editorial/general/malaysias-broad-mix-still-waiting-to-merge-
happily/809296. 
 90 Id. 
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racial discrimination in university intake and civil service jobs.91  
This has polarized Malays and non-Malays and caused resentment 
and a sense of being treated as second class citizens, compounded 
by the excessive emphasis on the Malay language and culture in 
the public school system.92  Indeed, the idea was that affirmative 
action was meant to be temporary until Malays were economically 
on par with non-Malays.93  The creation of a class of Malays over-
reliant on government subsidies thwarts efforts to develop a united 
nation and perpetuates a simmering source of ethnic tension fueled 
by Malay nationalism and non-Malay grievances.94  While the NEP 
was designed ultimately to promote national unity by reducing 
income disparity between the races, its racist orientation does not 
help bridge any ethnic divide.  In particular, the bumiputera 
varsity quota remains a major source of resentment nursed by the 
Chinese against Malays.95 
This resentment translated into a loss of political support.  In 
turn, the loss of political support manifested in the outcome of the 
2008 Malaysian General elections, where the ruling Barisan 
Nasional (“BN”) coalition, which had been in power for fifty-one 
years, suffered its worst post-Independence losses and lost its two-
thirds majority in parliament and several states.96  Prime Minister 
Badawi, whose policies were blamed for the decline in BN‟s 
political fortunes, resigned and handed the reins of power to Prime 
Minister Razak Najib in April 2009.97  In seeking to recapture the 
support of the disaffected Indian and Chinese minority groups, Mr. 
Najib has been speaking of the need to unite Malaysia‟s many 
 
 91 Article 136 of the Federal Constitution requires that civil servants be 
treated impartially regardless of race. MALAY. CONST. art. 136. 
 92 Graham K Brown, Making Ethnic Citizens: The Politics and Practice of 
Education in Malaysia, 27 INT‟L J. EDUC. DEV. 318, 318-30 (2007). 
 93 Rizal Salim & Abdul Halim, supra note 84, at 1-30. 
 94 Malay political leaders have also criticized the Malays for being lazy, 
ungrateful and over-reliant on bumiputera benefits. See generally DR. MAHATHIR 
MOHAMAD, MALAYS FORGET EASILY (2001). 
 95 Thomas Fuller, Malaysia to End Quotas That Favor Ethnic Malays, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 2009, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/07/01/world/asia/01malaysia.html. 
 96 Abdul Rashid Moten, 2004 and 2008 General Elections in Malaysia: 
Towards a Multicultural, Bi-party Political System?, 17 ASIAN J. POL. SCI. 173, 
173-94 (2009). 
 97 Najib Appointed New Malaysian PM, BBC NEWS, Apr. 3, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7980554.stm. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/2
    
2010] MINORITIES IN PLURAL DEMOCRACIES 65 
racial groups and of appreciating their contribution to Malaysia.98  
One of the recent reversals in policies include ending the 
bumiputera quota for the services sector in an attempt to improve 
Malaysia‟s international competitiveness in the global economy.99  
It seems that national considerations can trump communal 
considerations. 
III. MINORITIES AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
A general observation about institutional design is that in 
heterogeneous societies with deep ethnic and religious divisions, it 
is not advisable to have a purely majoritarian system, which 
usually entails the indefinite exclusion from power of a minority 
group, placing it in a position of permanent political non-
dominance and potentially without an outlet to air their 
grievances. The more pure a parliamentary system is, the closer it 
approximates the majoritarian model.  Unitary systems generally 
work best with homogenous populations.100 
Institutional means must be found to include these minority 
groups in the process not only of constitutional government, but 
also of constitution-making.  A shift from a majoritarian to a more 
consensual model of decision-making is reflected in the greater 
attention paid to deliberative processes with multiple entry points, 
to ensure that the legislative process takes into account non-
majoritarian concerns. So structured, institutions can produce 
more consensualist politics. 
 
 98 “We must reach out to all parts of Malaysia - to all our diverse 
communities. In our national discourse and in pursuing our national agenda, we 
must never leave anyone behind. We must reach out to the many who may have 
been disaffected and left confused by political games, deceit and showmanship." 
PM Najib's Maiden Speech: „One Malaysia. People First. Performance Now,‟ STAR 
ONLINE (Malay.), Apr. 3 2009, available at 
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2009/4/3/nation/20090403201619&sec=
nation. See also Choi Tuck Wo, Najib: 1Malaysia a Concept for the World' STAR 
ONLINE (Malay.), Oct. 7, 2009, http://thestar.com.my/news/story. 
asp?file=/2009/10/7/nation/4854896&sec=nation. The 1Malaysia website is at 
http://www.1malaysia.com.my/. 
 99 Adib Zalkapli, Najib Drops Bumiputera Quota for Services Sector, MALAY. 
INSIDER, Apr. 22, 2009, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com.my/ 
index.php/malaysia/24151-najib-drops-bumiputera-quota-for-services-sector. 
 100 See generally YASH GHAI, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND MINORITIES (2003). 
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A. Making Constitutions 
As an example of consensualist politics, a ninety-nine member 
Constitution Drafting Assembly was put in charge101 to draft the 
exemplary 1997 Thai Constitution (now superseded by the 2007 
draft produced after the September 2006 bloodless military 
coup).102  The process of composing the Assembly is instructive. 
The People got their say through an electoral process by which 
members were chosen from provinces, a total of seventy-six 
members, one for each province.  The remainder consisted of 
twenty-three members chosen from lawyers, political scientists, 
politicians and civil servants.  The key principle is that 
representatives should be chosen on an inclusive basis, to ensure 
that the final product is not dominated or hijacked by any one 
particular group (particularly bureaucrats, technocrats or the 
military).103 
B. Electoral Systems 
In terms of electoral systems, some of the best practices 
include designing a system to include members of different groups 
within the same unit or legislative body.  Ensuring that minorities 
have a voice in policy-making to express their concerns through 
guaranteeing legislative representation is an important 
consideration in ordering a Constitution.  This can be accomplished 
through various methods, but it is crucial to also secure political 
freedoms of speech, assembly and association.  This is necessary 
for a vibrant multi-party system where political groups are able to 
form and to campaign for support. 
 
 101 James R Klein, The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997: A 
Blueprint for Participatory Democracy 9-14 (Asia Found. Series, Working Paper 
No. 8, 1998), available at http://asiafoundation.org/pdf/wp8.pdf.  See Andrew 
Harding, May There be Virtue: New Asian Constitutionalism in Thailand, 3 
AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 24 (2001). 
 102 Erik Martinez Kuhonta, The Paradox of Thailand's 1997 "People's 
Constitution": Be Careful What You Wish for, 48 ASIAN SURV. 373, 373-92 (2008); 
see also Bjorn Dressel, Thailand's Elusive Quest for a Workable Constitution, 
1997-2007, 31 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA J. INT‟L & STRAT. AFF. 296 (2009). 
 103 See Harding, supra note 101. 
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C. Ethnic Politics and Multi-Ethnic Coalition Government 
In Malaysia, ethnic politics have not been legally barred 
within its multi-ethnic society; instead, it is “allow[ed] . . . 
responsible expression.”104  Malaysia practices a form of 
parliamentary government based on the Westminster model and 
the principle of simple plurality (first past the post), and the one-
man, one-vote model.105 
In practice, this has produced multi-ethnic coalition 
government among political parties which are ethnically and 
racially based. For example, the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition, 
which has governed Malaysia since Independence in 1957, is 
dominated by UMNO (Malays), MCA (Chinese), and MIA 
(Indians).106  Within a multi-ethnic coalition, ethnic and region-
based interests are moderated.107 
 D. Proportional Representation 
Alternatives to a purely majoritarian system include 
proportional representation systems or intermediate systems, such 
as those which are generally majoritarian but offer guaranteed 
representation to particular minorities. While the proportional 
representation system produces proportionality and minority 
representation (the percentage of votes a group receives translates 
into a similar percentage of legislative seats), Singapore has 
always rejected this approach for fear it would produce communal 
politicking and a weak coalition government contrary to the 
 
 104 Badawi, supra note 76, ¶ 24. 
 105 TOMMY THOMAS, THE PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVES: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN THE 
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 152-62 (Graham Hassall & Cheryl Saunders eds., 1997). 
 106 DIANE K. MAUZY, BARISAN NASIONAL: COALITION GOVERNMENT IN MALAYSIA 
(1st ed. 1983). 
 107 Ethnic relations have always been the leitmotif of Malaysian politics since 
the Country's independence in 1957.  The government has been a coalition of 
ethnic-based political parties.  The Alliance, which ruled the country from 1957 to 
1972, was a coalition of political parties composed of the United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the 
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC).  After 1972, the Alliance was broadened to 
include several smaller parties and was renamed the National Front (Barisan 
Nasional).  The dominant political party in the coalition is undoubtedly the 
UMNO. See generally Jaclyn Ling-Chien Neo, Malay Nationalism, Islamic 
Supremacy and the Constitutional Bargain in the Multi-ethnic Composition of 
Malaysia, 13 INT‟L J. ON MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 95 (2006). 
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objectives of a developmentalist state.108 
E. Institutionalizing Multi-Racial Politics: The Group 
Representation Constituency and Minority Legislative 
Representation 
Singapore practices a system of parliamentary democracy 
whereby the will of the people is broadly the basis of the authority 
of government, with the Singapore government asserting that it is 
accountable through periodic secret free elections.  This is based on 
the Westminster model of parliamentary government, the elements 
of which include: 
 
(1) A unicameral or bicameral chamber whose members are 
freely elected by universal adult suffrage; 
(2) From one of more political parties; 
(3) Executive power vested in a head of state but primarily 
exercised by cabinet government headed by a prime minister as 
head of government; 
(4) The head of government is chosen from the political party 
commanding the support of the legislative majority and 
answerable to that elective chamber; 
(5) A recognized opposition; and 
(6) A set of constitutional conventions. 109 
In 1988, Singapore altered its one-man one-vote electoral 
system based on single member wards by introducing the Group 
Representation Constituency (“GRC”), where multi-member teams 
contest an electoral ward.110  The original rationale of the GRC 
 
 108 Indeed, the prevailing philosophy in the early days of independence was 
assimilationist in assuming that the interests of minority communities are best 
secured by protecting the equal rights of all citizens, regardless of race or religion. 
Statement of S. Rajaretnam, Minister for Foreign Affairs, SING. PARL. DEB. vol. 
25, cols. 1353-1372 (Mar. 16, 1967). See generally JACLYN LING-CHIEN, THE 
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES AND THE CONSTITUTION: A JUDICIOUS BALANCE, in 
EVOLUTION OF A REVOLUTION: FORTY YEARS OF THE SINGAPORE CONSTITUTION 234-
59 (Li-ann Thio & Kevin Y. L. Tan eds., 2009) (discussing Singapore's minority's 
protection under its constitution). 
 109 Modified from William Dale, The Making and Remaking of Commonwealth 
Constitutions, 42 INT‟L & COMP. L. Q. 67, 72-73 (1993). 
 110 Li-ann Thio, The Right to Political Participation in Singapore: Tailor-
Making a Westminster-Modelled Constitution to fit the Imperatives of „Asian‟ 
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scheme was to promote political stability by institutionalizing 
multi-racialism in the composition of Parliament.111  Each GRC 
team must field a candidate from a stipulated minority group.112  A 
nominal number of eight single member constituencies (“SMCs”) 
were retained.113  The ostensible purpose of the scheme was to 
guarantee minority representation in Parliament. However, the 
reasons given for the subsequent enlargement of GRC team sizes 
from three-member teams to teams ranging from four to six 
members was unrelated to the original objective of guaranteeing 
minority representation; instead, these amendments were 
designed to serve the unrelated purposes of facilitating the 
operation of town councils and community development councils, 
which are forms of local governance.114 
After the 1984 elections, the ruling People‟s Action Party 
(“PAP”) expressed the fear that younger voters preferred 
candidates best suited to serve their own needs, disregarding the 
importance of returning “a racially balanced party slate of 
candidates.”115  Thus, a corrective measure to ensure that majority 
rule did not eventuate in the neglect of minority interests was 
introduced in the form of the GRC, which is basically a mega-
constituency created by the merging together of three former 
SMCs.116  It is contested on the basis of teams of four to six 
candidates. In assembling multi-racial teams, political parties 
would have to enter into inter-ethnic party alliances which would 
moderate racial politics.  In effect, the PAP government was 
institutionalizing its own political practice of fielding a slate of 
multi-racial candidates and thereby requiring other political 
 
Democracy, 6 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 181, 216-19 (2002). 
 111 Id. 
 112 SING. CONST. art. 39A(2), available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/. 
 113 SING. CONST. art. 39A; Parliamentary Elections Act, ch. 218, § 8A(1)(a) 
(Sing.). 
 114 For a critique of the GRC scheme in hindering political pluralism (the 
political opposition has never won a GRC ward since its inception in 1988 and 
critics argue that the GRC scheme serves to perpetuate the hegemony of the 
People‟s Action Party which has been in power since independence in 1965), see 
THIO, supra note 110, at 181-243. 
 115 The racial composition of Singapore is approximately 77.7% Chinese, 14.1% 
Malay, 7.1% Indians and 1.1% „Other‟ races. See Andreas Ackermann, They Give 
Us the Categories and We Fill Ourselves in: Ethnic Thinking in Singapore, 4 INT‟L 
J. ON MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 451 (1997). 
 116 Thio, supra note 110, at 216-19. 
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parties, some of which were ethnic-based, to practice multi-ethnic 
politics.117  Notably, the Constitution itself does not stipulate a 
minority quota and only provides that a minority candidate be 
fielded in each GRC.118  An increase in the size and numbers of 
GRCs might entail a corresponding quantitative decline in 
minority representation. 
F. Legislative Oversight? 
The government has also created constitutional institutions to 
supervise legislation and protect minority groups against 
discrimination,  The Singapore Government, for example, adopted 
the proposal of the 1966 constitutional commission for a multi-
racial watchdog body called the Council of State, designed to 
scrutinize potentially discriminatory legislation.119  This quasi 
Second Chamber was later renamed the Presidential Council on 
Minority Rights (“PCMR”), tasked with reviewing legislation which 
had “differentiating measures.”120  This was defined in Article 68 
as measures which in their practical application would be 
“disadvantageous to persons of any racial or religious community.”  
Its members include the Chief Justice, Prime Minister (PM), senior 
Cabinet members, and the Attorney General. 
Law Minister EW Barker traced its origins to the 1958 
Kenyan constitution.121 Upon independence, Kenya removed this 
institution for fear it would perpetuate racial discrimination and 
undermine ministerial responsibility.122 Nevertheless, Barker 
considered this “a promising innovation” in Singapore to ensure 
harmonious social relations; being advisory in nature, it could not 
 
 117 Li-ann Thio, The Passage of a Generation: Revising the 1966 Constitutional 
Commission, in THE EVOLUTION OF A REVOLUTION: 40 YEARS OF THE SINGAPORE 
CONSTITUTION 7-49, 40 (Li-ann Thio & Kevin YL Tan eds., 2008). 
 118 SING. CONST. art. 39A(2). 
 119 Thio, supra note 117, at 60. 
 120 SING. CONST. art. 68. 
 121 Conversely, Gerald de Cruz argued that its historical origins were “entirely 
local”, stemming from the proposal for a Council of Races to scrutinize laws to 
prevent discrimination on the grounds of race, religion and sex in the proposed 
People‟s Constitution for Malaya (including Singapore) put forward in 1947 by 
Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action and Pusat Tenaga Raayat that appeared in 
STRAITS TIMES, May 28, 1969. Gerald de Cruz, The Presidential Council, 1 SING. L. 
REV. 20, 20-25 (1969). 
 122 Thio, supra note 119, at 18. 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/2
    
2010] MINORITIES IN PLURAL DEMOCRACIES 71 
significantly impede the legislative agenda, leaving “the legislative 
primacy of Parliament unaffected.”123 This was favored over 
proposals to have a Committee of minority representatives chosen 
directly by minority groups to represent minorities in the elected 
chamber of Parliament or to elect or nominate minorities to sit in 
an Upper House.124  The desire to not allow minorities to directly 
elect minority representatives has remained a consistent feature of 
PAP policy, fearing that it would spark communalism and 
destabilize society. 
The deficiencies of the PCMR as a mechanism of legislative 
oversight have been well documented.125  All PCMR proceedings 
are held in camera.126  Article 87 provides that “any Minister, 
Minister of State or Parliamentary Secretary specially authorized 
by the Prime Minister” may attend these private meetings.127  The 
lack of publicity diminishes its potential role as a watchdog against 
racial discrimination.  Furthermore, it is hampered in its task to 
protect minority rights and obstruct the passage of discriminatory 
legislation which might impair communal harmony.  This is 
because the PCMR only receives legislative bills after the third 
reading, rather than during second reading where it could more 
effectively highlight controversial provisions to parliamentarians 
and conceivably have some input in the substantive content of the 
bill, before its enacted. 128  If the PCMR received the bill and could 
render its report, whether adverse or otherwise, before the second 
reading, parliamentarians could have the benefit of its analysis 
before debating the bill. 
Even when the PCMR finds a “differentiating measure” in a 
bill, it has limited powers.  The PCMR may make an adverse 
report to the Speaker who will present the bill to Parliament for 
 
 123 Law Minister Edmund William Barker, 25 Sing. Parl. Rep., col. 1389, at 
1431-32 (Mar. 17, 1967). 
 124 REP. CONST. COMM., at 13, para. 46 (1966) (Sing.). 
 125 See Thio Su Mien, The Presidential Council, 1 SING. L. REV. 2 (1969); David 
Marshall, The Presidential Council, 1 SING. L. REV. 9 (1969). 
 126 Li-ann Thio,The Passage of a Generation: Revisiting the 1996 
Constitutional Commission, in THE EVOLUTION OF A REVOLUTION: 40 YEARS OF THE 
SINGAPORE CONSTITUTION 7-49, 44(Li-ann Thio & Kevin YL Tan eds., 2009). 
 127 SING. CONST. art. 84. 
 128 Article 78(1) of the Singapore Constitution only obliges the Speaker to 
present an authentic copy of the bill to the PCMR after its third and final stage, 
prior to the presentment for presidential assent, after the conclusion of 
parliamentary deliberations. SING. CONST. art. 78(1). 
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amendment.  A check exists insofar as Article 78(6)(a) provides 
that such a bill cannot be presented to the President for assent 
unless the Speaker certifying it is free of „differentiating 
measures.‟129  However, a two-thirds parliamentary majority can 
easily circumvent this under the Article 78(6)(c) procedure by 
endorsing a motion to present the bill to the President 
notwithstanding an adverse report.  The cabinet‟s ability to muster 
this parliamentary majority is a given, as the current government 
overwhelmingly controls eighty-two of eighty-four elected 
parliamentary seats in a dominant one party state.  The only 
“check” is the resultant publicity the overriding of an adverse 
report may elicit. However, no adverse report has ever been made. 
Any legislative oversight body must have sufficiently strong 
powers to constitute a real check against discriminatory 
legislation; the public should have access to it to facilitate focused 
citizen participation in policy-making, and such body should have 
the opportunity to contribute to the process of legislative scrutiny, 
rather than exist merely as a cosmetic body or psychological 
comforter. Weak and ineffectual institutions are unlikely to 
alleviate minority fears of majority abuse.  To effectively protect 
minorities, institutions should be constructed to ensure effective 
modes of accountability, transparency and participation. 
IV. SOCIAL-CULTURAL DIMENSION OF MINORITIES ISSUES – 
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND TRIBAL LOYALTY 
Nationalism can be fostered through symbols and myths or 
even through enshrining an official religion in the Constitution, 
though this can be very divisive in a multi-religious, multi-ethnic 
setting.130 
The call to accord constitutional status to a religion indicates 
the importance of religion as a source of legitimacy and as an 
influential component of the worldview of religious believers.  
 
 129 SING. CONST. art. 68 (defines “differentiating measure" as “any measure 
which is, or is likely in its practical application to be, disadvantageous to persons 
of any racial or religious community and not equally disadvantageous to persons 
of other such communities, either directly by prejudicing persons of that 
community or indirectly by giving advantage to persons of another community.”). 
 130 See, e.g., Mark Juergensmeyer, The Debate over Hindutva, 26 RELIGION 129 
(1996); BRENDA COSSMAN & RATNA KAPUR, SECULARISM'S LAST SIGH?: HINDUTVA 
AND THE (MIS) RULE OF LAW (2002). 
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However, it also reveals a clash of competing constitutional 
paradigms in terms of how to organize law, society, and the 
individual.  In South-East Asia, Islamic revivalism has fueled calls 
for a legal system based on Islamic law, which clashed with 
common law systems after the American model (Philippines), 
hybridized by Spanish civilian influences, or the British model 
(Malaysia).  As Harding noted: “[T]he failure of Islamic law to 
attain the status of global doctrine in maritime South East Asia 
probably represents the largest single remaining grievance in 
connection with the imposition of colonial law.”131  With the 
introduction of colonial rule and the principle of secular 
government with some limited accommodation of minority religion, 
legal pluralism has confined the operation of Islamic law to a 
narrow range of matters pertaining to personal, customary, and 
family law.132 
Secularism itself as a constitutional principle is a useful 
ordering device for state-religion relations insofar as it does not 
adopt the form of a substantive, anti-theistic ideology which is 
hostile towards religious belief.133  Rather than descend into a form 
of secular fundamentalism, the principle of secularity operates as a 
framework under which disparate religious groups may peacefully 
co-exist.  This requires that religious (and non religious) groups are 
treated equally under the law, that is, the state is to adopt a 
neutral posture towards religious groups. 
However, a resurgence of religiosity and its demands to enter 
into the public realm challenges the secular framework.  This could 
be in the form of demanding the implementation of religious law, 
such as the Islamic syariah, pursuant to establishing an Islamic 
state where religion and politics are unified, not separated.  
Alternatively, where there are calls to recognize an official state 
 
 131 Andrew Harding, Global Doctrine and Local Knowledge: Law in South East 
Asia, 51 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 35, 40 (2002). 
 132 Donald L. Horowitz, The Qur'an and the Common Law: Islamic Law 
Reform and the Theory of Legal Change, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 543, 543-80 (1994). 
 133 See, e.g., András Sajó, Preliminaries to a Concept of Constitutional 
Secularism, 6 INT'L J. CONST . L. 605, 605-29 (2008); John Finnis, On the Practical 
Meaning of Secularism, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 491 (1998); Ian T. Benson, Notes 
Towards a (Re) Definition of the “Secular”, 33 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 519, 519-49 
(2000); William M. McClay, Two Concepts of Secularism, 13 J. OF POL‟Y HIST. 47 
(2001); T.N. Madan, Secularism in Its Place, 46 J. ASIAN STUD. 759 (1987); Paul F. 
Campos, Secular Fundamentalism, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1814 (1994). 
31
  
74 PACE INT‟L L. REV. [Vol.  22:1 
religion, which would privilege it, sparking off tension with 
religious minorities.  This is because in such situations, the state 
has been called upon not to serve as neutral arbiter between 
competing religious claims, but to afford preferential treatment to 
the religious beliefs and practices of a resurgent religious group. 
A. Malaysia: Judicial Revisionist of the Constitutional Pre-
Commitment to Promote Malay/Islamic Supremacy and the Threat 
to Human Rights 
The Singapore and Malaysian approach towards the scope of 
religious liberty differs starkly, although the Article 15 religious 
guarantee clause under the Singapore Constitution derives from 
Article 11 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia.134  Singapore 
seceded from the federation in 1965 and embarked upon its own 
distinctive approach towards securing religious liberty in a multi-
religious setting.135 
The very notion of “accommodative secularism”136 in the 
Singapore context relates to the Constitution‟s guarantee of 
religious freedom being premised on “removing restrictions to one‟s 
choice of religious belief,” as the state is agnostic about religious 
truth claims.  However, Article 11 of the Malaysian Constitution is 
construed more strictly; it provides that “[e]very person has the 
right to profess and practice his religion and, subject to Clause (4), 
to propagate it.”137  The Singapore version excludes reference to 
state legislative power to enact anti-propagation laws. 
The more restrictive Malaysian approach has been most 
apparent in apostasy cases, which have stirred both racial and 
 
 134 MALAY. CONST. art.11, available at http://confinder.richmond.edu/ 
admin/docs/malaysia.pdf. 
 135 Li-ann Thio, Control, Co-Optation and Co-Operation: Managing Religious 
Harmony in Singapore's Multi-Ethnic, Quasi-Secular State, 33 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 197 (2006). The religious breakdown of the Singapore population has been 
reported as follows: Buddhists & Taoists (51%); Muslims (15%); Christians (15%); 
Hindus (4%); No Religion (13%) and Other Religions (2%). DAVID CHAN, ATTITUDE 
ON RACE AND RELIGION: SURVEY ON SOCIAL ATTITUDES OF SINGAPOREANS (SAS) 2001 
(2002), available at http://www.mcys.gov.sg/MCDSFiles/download/MCDS-RR.pdf. 
 136 Nappalli Peter Williams v. Inst. of Technical Educ., [1999] 2 S.L.R. 569, 
576 ¶ 29 (Sing. Ct. App. 1999). 
 137 Clause 4 reads: “State law and in respect of the Federal Territories of 
Kuala Lumpur and Lubuan, federal law may control or restrict the propagation of 
any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam.” 
MALAY. CONST. art. 11. 
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religious tensions. This has arisen in relation to the so-called “body 
snatcher” cases, where a deceased Hindu who had apparently 
converted to Islam without his wife‟s knowledge, had his body 
appropriated by the state Islamic agency for Muslim burial, 
contrary to the wishes of the wife who insisted he was Hindu.138 
Although the civil courts have declined to hear apostasy cases 
asserting a lack of jurisdiction on dubious grounds, given the 
involvement of a constitutional issue, certain High Court Justices, 
unable to separate their religious affiliations from their official 
duties, have nonetheless proffered attenuated readings of the scope 
of religious freedom.139 
Contrary to international human rights standards, the right to 
“profess” a religion has been restrictively construed to exclude a 
right to free conscience, including the “freedom to change . . . 
religion.”140  In Daud bin Mamat v. Majlis Agama Islam, the High 
Court Justice held that exiting a religion “is certainly not a 
religion” and, in the absence of an express right to renounce 
religion, to infer that Article 11(1) protected this “would stretch the 
scope of [Article] 11(1) of the Federal Constitution to ridiculous 
heights, and rebel against the canon of construction.”141  Apostasy 
or religious conversions are a particularly sensitive issue within 
the Muslim community in Malaysia, although there are divergent 
opinions as to whether the law should punish apostates or whether 
this should be a matter for the afterlife as “there is no compulsion 
in Islam.”142 In the notorious case of Lina Joy,143 which involved a 
Malay Muslim woman who had converted to Christianity and 
 
 138 Devinder Singh, Moorthy Buried as a Muslim, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malay.), 
Dec. 12, 2005, at 4. 
 139 Id. at 197-226. 
 140 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 18, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
 141 Id. 
 142 E.g., verse 2:256 of the Quran. See generally Abdullahi An-Niam, Human 
Rights in the Muslim World 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13 (1990). 
 143 Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan dan lain-lain, [2007] 
4 M.L.J. 585, aff'g Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor, [2004] 2 
M.L.J. 119 (Malay.).  See also Li-ann Thio, Apostasy and Religious Freedom: 
Constitutional Issues Arising from the Lina Joy Litigation, 2 MALAY. L.J. 1 (2006). 
For a discussion of the Federal Court decision (which did not introduce any 
substantially new argument not already canvassed at the lower judicial levels), 
see Joshua Neoh, Islamic State and the Common Law in Malaysia: A Case Study 
of Lina Joy, GLOBAL JURIST 8.2 (2008), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/joshua_neoh/. 
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unsuccessfully sought to have this reflected through changing her 
name and religion on her identity card, the High Court Justice 
raised a “public order”144 argument as a limitation on Article 11(1).  
Justice Faiza Thamby Chik stated that if Muslims were allowed to 
convert out of Islam at will, this would affect Article 11, Sections 
(4) and (5), which served to protect harmony and safeguard the 
“interests of Muslims and non-Muslims.”145 
Thus, rather than free agency, a Muslim‟s personal choice to 
change religious affiliation implicated public order, contrary to 
Minister for Home Affairs Malaysia v. Jamaluddin bin Othman, 
which the Justice did not discuss, despite its relevance.146  The 
Supreme Court quashed an Internal Security Act preventive 
detention order issued against Jamaluddin, a Malay Christian 
convert who was involved in a program to propagate Christianity 
among Malays, apparently converting six Malays to 
Christianity.147  Rejecting the argument that such activities could 
create tensions between the Christian and Muslim communities, 
the Court found no security threat under the terms of the Act.148  
Article 11 could be exercised provided it did not “go beyond what 
can normally be regarded as professing and practicing one‟s 
religion,” as this liberty was subject to general laws.149 
To Justice Chik, a Muslim seeking to convert out of Islam had 
to get a Syariah court declaration of apostasy (even thought this is 
near impossible either because there is no legal provision 
 
 144 Article 11(5) of the Singapore Constitution provides: “This Article does not 
authorize any act contrary to any general law relating to public order, public 
health or morality.” SING. CONST. art. 11(5). 
 145 Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 119, 133 ¶ 29 
(Malay.). 
 146 Id. 
 147 One of four allegations for the grounds of detention was that the 
respondent "converted into Christianity six Malays." Malaysia v. Jamaluddin bin 
Othman, [1989] 1 M.L.J. 418 (Malay.) (quoting Hashim Yeop A Sani CJ, Minister 
for Home Affairs). 
 148 See Nicole Fritz & Martin Flaherty, Unjust Order: Malaysia‟s Internal 
Security Act, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1345 (2003). 
 149 Bari criticized Jamaluddin as a decision which “could not fit into the 
history and character” of the Federation as he thought it failed to consider the 
supremacy of Islam in article 3 or to “take into account the intimate relationship 
between the Malays and Islam” which would presumably lead to a greater 
readiness to find public order imperiled. Abdul Aziz Bari, Islam in the Federal 
Constitution: A Commentary on the Decision in Meor Atiqulrahman, 2 MALAY. 
L.J., at cxxxiii (2002). 
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facilitating this and because the courts have never granted a 
Malay an apostasy order); that is, the decision was not decided by 
constitutional standards but by religious standards.  Justice Chik 
referred to Article 160 of the Malay Constitution which defines 
“Malay” as a “person who professes the religion of Islam, 
habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay custom . 
. . .”  He then stated that Lina Joy, as an ethnic Malay, “remains in 
the Islamic faith until his or her dying days.”150 Thus, if this is the 
correct legal interpretation, Malays are barred from converting out 
of Islam.  This violation of conscience and the freedom to choose, 
change or reject a religion is an oppressive ascription of 
constitutional identity.  A more humane and rights-based approach 
towards handling apostasy and religious freedom would be to 
exclude a murtad (former Malay Muslim) from the constitutional 
definition of “Malay” and the privileges this class is entitled to as 
bumiputera. 
Further, if Justice Chik‟s interpretation is correct, an equal 
protection issue under Article 8 arises. A non-Malay convert to 
Islam (mualaf) who decides to leave Islam must report such 
decision to the relevant state Islamic authority who determines the 
validity of such renunciation: Hun Mun Meng.151 Thus, distinct 
regimes emerge for three categories of Malaysian citizens based on 
their religious identity. First, all Malays are ipso facto Muslims by 
dint of Article 160, regardless of personal choice.  Thus, renouncing 
Islam would be a legal impossibility, as the Constitution assigns 
an immutable religious identity.  Recourse to the Syariah court to 
determine the validity of a declaration of apostasy would be 
redundant.  Second, all non-Malay Muslims who decide to leave 
Islam have a qualified right to change religion, contingent upon 
receiving official religious approval from the relevant state 
religious authority.  This reduces religious freedom to a license.  
Third, all non-Muslims persons professing a faith enjoy 
unhindered freedom of religious choice; religious freedom is 
conceived of as an inherent individual entitlement, consonant with 
the human right to religious freedom.  Thus, the application of 
Article 11(1) differs, owing to the judicial erection of different 
regimes governing Muslim and non-Muslim religious choice. 
 
 150 Lina Joy, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 119 at 143H, ¶ 58. 
 151 Majlis Agama Islam Negeri Sembilan v. Hun Mun Meng, [1992] 2 M.L.J. 
676, 143I, ¶ 58 (Malay.). 
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Muslims are afforded a truncated scope of religious liberty and 
receive unequal protection.  The dictates of the positive syariah 
law, so conceived and applied by Syariah courts, apparently trump 
constitutional norms by creating an exceptional regime where 
constitutional norms do not apply, contrary to the tenet of 
constitutional supremacy. 
Furthermore, Justice Chik invoked Article 3 in a dubious, 
legally unsound manner by extending the application of Islamic 
values in Malaysian public law, contrary to precedent. 
Article 3 provides that Islam is the religion of the Federation, 
but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in any 
part of the Federation.  In the Supreme Court decision of Che 
Omar bin Che Soh v. Public Prosecutor, the meaning of “Islam” in 
the constitutional context was discussed.152  British colonial rule, 
by introducing a secular legal system, had rolled back and confined 
the application of Islamic laws to personal matters, dividing Islam 
into public and private spheres,153 not treating it as ad-adeen.154 
Islam itself is holistic in terms of prescribing a way of life and does 
not differentiate between the temporal and spiritual. 
Lord President Tun Salleh Abas, a Muslim, recognized that 
Islam was “not just a mere collection of dogmas and rituals,” but “a 
complete way of life covering all fields of human activities, may 
they be private or public, legal, political, economic, social, cultural, 
moral or judicial.”155  Nevertheless, he distinguished this from the 
meaning of “Islam” in Article 3.  In feeling bound to adopt the 
meaning of “Islam” as comprehended by the constitutional framers, 
“until the law and the system is changed,” he stated: 
 
[W]e have to set aside our personal feelings because the law in 
this country is still what it is today, secular law, where 
morality not accepted by the law is not enjoying the status of 
law.  Perhaps that argument should be addressed at other 
forums or at seminars and, perhaps, to politicians and 
 
 152 Che Omar bin Che Soh v. Pub. Prosecutor, [1988] 2 M.L.J. 55 (Malay.). 
 153 Id. at 56H-I. 
 154 SIMON C. SMITH, BRITISH RELATIONS WITH THE MALAY RULERS FROM 
DECENTRALISATION TO MALAYAN INDEPENDENCE 1930-1957, 102 (1995). 
 155 Che Omar, 2 M.L.J. at 56C (quoting SAYED ABUL „ALA MAUDOOD, THE 
ISLAMIC LAW AND CONSTITUTION (7th ed. 1980)). 
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Parliament.156 
British rule thus “secularized” public law and confined the 
scope of application of Islamic law: 
 
The development of the public aspect of Islam had left the 
religion as a mere adjunct to the ruler‟s power and sovereignty. 
The ruler ceased to be regarded as God‟s vicegerent on earth 
but was regarded as a sovereign within his territory. The 
concept of sovereignty ascribed to humans is alien to Islamic 
religion because in Islam, sovereignty belongs to God alone.  
By ascribing sovereignty to the ruler, i.e.[,] to a human, the 
divine source of legal validity is severed and thus the British 
turned the system into a secular institution. Thus all laws 
including administration of Islamic laws had to receive this 
validity through a secular fiat.  Although theoretically because 
the sovereignty of the ruler was absolute in the sense that he 
could do what he likes, and govern according to what he 
thought fit, the Anglo/Malay Treaties restricted this power . . . 
.  The law was only applicable to Muslims as their personal 
law . . . during the British colonial period, through their 
system of indirect rule and establishment of secular 
institutions, Islamic law was rendered isolated in a narrow 
confinement of the law of marriage, divorce and inheritance 
only. 157 
In addition, when the Independence Merdeka Constitution 
was being drafted, there were reservations over the inclusion of the 
word “Islam” in Article 3.158  The sole dissenting member of the 
Reid Constitutional Commission, Pakistani Justice Abdul Hamid, 
supported the Alliance159 proposal to include in the text an 
“innocuous” Islam clause.160  This was adopted after assurances 
were given that its inclusion did not change the status quo 
 
 156 Id. at 57E-F. 
 157 Id. at 56I-F (quoting MICHAEL BARRY HOOKER, ISLAMIC LAW IN SOUTH-EAST 
ASIA (1984)). 
 158 Joseph Fernando, The Position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia, 37 
J. SE. ASIAN STUD. 249, 253 (2006). 
 159 The Alliance was a combination of the political parties of the three main 
communities in Malaysia: United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), 
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and Malayan Indian Congress. Since 
independence, UMNO has dominated the system of parliamentary government. 
 160 Fernando, supra note 158, at 256. 
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regarding Islam‟s symbolic role in the constitutional order.161  The 
Alliance assured the Colonial Office that “Malaya would be a 
secular state,” without elaborating upon the meaning of 
secularity.162  Within the Alliance, the United Malays National 
Organization (“UMNO”) leaders had to ensure their non-Muslim 
counterparts that the clause would be symbolic and that it was not 
intended to have practical effect,163 and would not entail the 
creation of a Muslim theocracy, in order to secure their 
acquiescence.164  As UMNO and Alliance leader Tunku Abdul 
Rahman clarified during 1958 legislative council debates, Malaysia 
“is not an Islamic state as it is generally understood, we merely 
provide that Islam shall be the official religion of the State.165 The 
understanding was that Article 3 merely fixed the official religion. 
B. Malaysia and Islamic Revivalism: Breaching the Social 
Compact and Precipitating Tensions 
As borne out through constitutional history and apex court 
precedent, Malaysia is constitutionally a secular state.166  
Constitutional orthodoxy has been blithely disregarded in 
subsequent cases, in the face of political Islamic revivalism, which 
has seeped into judicial reasoning.  Justice Chik in Lina Joy, 
argued that Article 3 had a “far wider and meaningful purpose” 
than merely a symbolic role, and emphasized that by dint of Article 
 
 161 REPORT OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (1957), 
¶ 161, reprinted in KEVIN YL TAN & THIO LI-ANN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 
MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE 968 (Butterworths Asia 2d ed. 1977). 
 162 FERNANDO, supra note 82, at 162-63. See also J. Norman Parmer, 
Constitutional Change in Malaya‟s Plural Society, 26 FAR E. SURVEY 149 (1957). 
 163 A.J. Harding, Islam and Public Law in Malaysia: Some Reflections in the 
Aftermath of Susie Teoh‟s Case, 1 MALAY. L.J., at xci (1991); FERNANDO, supra 
note 82, at 162. 
 164 FERNANDO, supra note 82, at 162-63. 
 165 CONTEMPORARY MALAYSIA 156 (Wu Min Aun ed., 1999) (quoting Official 
Report of Legislative Council Debates (1958)). In 1984, former Prime Minister 
Tunku Abdul Rahman stated: “this country is a secular state. It means that it is 
not a Muslim state. Islam is the official religion of this country, but other religions 
have a right to play their part as far as religion is concerned. That is about it but 
it is not absolutely a secular state because if it were so, there would be officially 
no religion. The Constitution has more or less settled the point.” Tunku Abdul 
Rahman Putra, The Role of Religion in Nation Building, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 
ON MALAYSIAN RELIGIONS 25 (Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra et al. eds., 1984). 
 166 Joseph M. Fernando, The Position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia, 
37 J. SE. ASIAN STUD. 249, 249-66 (2006). 
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3, “Islam is given a special position and status.”167  He then took a 
quantum leap of illogic in positing the supremacy of Article 3 and 
his vision of Islam, which qualified the Article 11 religious freedom 
guarantee.  Justice Chik sought to give effect to the supremacy of 
Islamic values and a particular Islamic view of apostasy through 
attributing a quasi-grundnorm status to Article 3 and through 
that, to syariah law. This is creative revisionism, which displays 
infidelity to constitutional history, lacks any principled analysis, 
ignores the canons of constitutional construction, and 
demonstrates how Justices can abdicate their task in succumbing 
to the politicization of Islam in a country where political parties 
seek to outstrip each other through religious fervor to gain popular 
support. 
One of the functions of the constitution is that it serves as a 
pre-commitment strategy, entrenching principles on whose basis 
minorities join a polity.  In the case of Malaysia, this was the 
secularity of the Malaysian state. These latter-day judicial 
interpretations ride roughshod over constitutional values by 
ascribing supreme status to Islam168 and interpreting 
 
 167 [2004] 2 M.L.J. 119 at 127C, ¶ 12. 
 168 This was evident in the High Court case of Meor Atiqulrahman bin Ishak v. 
Fatimah bte Sihi, [2000] 5 M.L.J. 375, decided on August 6, 1999 by the High 
Court of Seremban concerning the Serban Controversy, which was reversed by 
the Federal Court.  Justice Noor had treated the supremacy of Islam as a sort of 
quasi-constitutional grundnorm framing his interpretive matrix. He declared:  
“Islam is not of equal status with the other religions; it does not sit alongside or 
stand together.  Islam sits above, it walks first, and is placed in an open space 
with a loud voice.  Islam is like the teak tree – tall, firm and able.  Otherwise, 
Islam will not be the religion of the Federation but just another of the few 
religions professed in the country and everybody would be equally free to practice 
any religion, with none better than any other.” He considered the government 
duty bound to actively promote Islam:  “[T]he government is responsible for 
taking care of, improve and develop Islam as is done by the current government, 
for example building mosques and religious centers, sponsoring musabaqah al-
Quran, reciting the al-Quran, restricting acts forbidden by Islam like banning 
alcohol, gambling, prostitution and undesirable cultures, and by right should 
include making laws to ensure that religious places of other religions do not 
exceed or compete with National / State Mosques in terms of location and 
prominence, size and overly-majestic architecture, or too many and everywhere 
without control. Other religions must be arranged and directed to ensure that 
they are practiced peacefully and do not threaten the dominant position of Islam, 
not just at the present but more importantly in the future and beyond.” 
(Translated from Malay). For an analysis, see Li-ann Thio & Jaclyn Ling-Chen 
Neo, Religious Dress in Schools: The Serban Controversy in Malaysia, 55 INT'L & 
COMP. L. Q. 671, 671-88 (2006). 
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constitutional provisions through the preferred Islamic values of 
certain Justices.  This importation of Islamic values into public law 
discounts the concerns of religious minorities that Malaysia would 
become a Muslim theocracy,169 and the conditions of the social 
compact which grounded their entry into the Malaysian federation.  
This has been a cause of fear and tension and a source of political 
instability.  Infidelity to constitutional values can thus precipitate 
social instability, whether in a court of law or a court of public 
opinion. 
Whereas “secularism” in Singapore entails the government 
treating all religions equally and with a respectful attitude,170 in 
Malaysia, Islam is given a privileged position,171 reflecting the 
desire of certain sectors to break Islamic values free from the 
narrow confines on personal and religious life so that it can 
influence and shape public law and public life,  and indeed, non-
Muslims.172  This has disquieted other religious minorities and has 
 
 169 FERNANDO, supra note 82, at 217 (discussing the assurances given by 
UMNO leaders to British officials that Malaya would be a secular state and not a 
theocracy). 
 170 A Government official has noted that while Singapore is secular, it is not 
atheistic, that the government should not be antagonistic to religious beliefs and 
the government “is secular but it is certainly not atheistic.”  Singapore‟s Political 
Arena, STRAITS TIMES, May 27, 2009, available at 
www.law.nus.edu.sg/news/archive/2009/ST270509.pdf.  See also Li-ann Thio, 
Control, Co-optation and Co-Operating: Managing Religious Harmony in 
Singapore‟s Multi-Ethnic, Quasi-Secular State, 33 HASTINGS INT‟L & COMP. L. REV. 
197, 197-253 (2007); Li-ann Thio, Secularism, the Singapore Way,  STRAITS TIMES, 
Oct. 30, 2007; Li-ann Thio, Religion in the Public Sphere of Singapore: Wall of 
Division or Public Square?, in  RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 73-104 (Bryan S. Turner ed., 2008). 
 171 There are constitutional provisions which relate to Islam apart from Article 
3, such as Article 12(2) which provides that state funds can be awarded to Islamic 
educational institutions, so it is clear Malaysia does not practice a strict 
separationist model of religion and state. MALAY. CONST. art.12(2). 
 172 For example, in child custody cases where a non-Muslim couple fight for 
custody of their children, after the husband converts to Islam, it has been held 
that non-Muslims are subject to the jurisdiction of syariah courts, even though 
the Constitution provides that syariah courts have limited jurisdiction over 
specified matters and only over Muslims.  List II (State List) Para. 1 of the Malay 
Constitution reads: “Except with respect to the Federal Territories of Kuala 
Lumpur and Labuan, Islamic law and personal and family law of persons 
professing the religion of Islam, including the Islamic law relating to succession, 
testate and intestate, betrothal, marriage, divorce, dower, maintenance, adoption, 
legitimacy guardianship, gifts, partitions and noncharitable trusts; Wakafs and 
the definition and regulation of charitable and religious endowments, institutions, 
trusts, charities and charitable institutions operating wholly within the State; 
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harmed Malaysia‟s reputation for respecting religious diversity 
and religious freedom.173 
C. Philippines and Muslim Mindanao: Gridlock in the Face of 
Intransigence Between the Supreme and the Divine 
The call for an Islamic state in the south of Philippines by 
separatist groups to establish a system of life and governance 
acceptance of Moro Muslims raises various contentious 
constitutional clashes.174 
The desire to have the Islamic Quran as the basic law of the 
land clashes with the status of the Philippines Constitution as the 
supreme law of the land, flowing from its direct promulgation by 
the sovereign Filipino people.175  This reflects a central tenet of 
modern democracy but, as Santos observes, “it is simply 
unthinkable to subordinate the God-given Quran to the man-made 
or even people-made Philippine Constitution. This is a matter or 
article of faith, where exalting the Constitution would be akin to 
shirk (idolatry), one of the worst sins in Islam . . . .  The Quran 
trumps the Constitution.”176  In this worldview, the Quran is a 
“veritable super-Constitution which covers the laws of marriage 
and family, of property and succession, of trade and commerce, of 
crime and punishment, of society and government, and of all other 
spheres of life.”177  This would include political ideology and, as 
such, it could not be inferior to the Constitution.178  This school of 
 
Malay customs. Zakat, Fitrah and Baitulmal or similar Islamic religious revenue, 
mosques or any Islamic public places of worship, creation and punishment of 
offences by persons professing the religion of Islam against precepts of that 
religion, except in regard to matters included in the Federal List; the constitution, 
organization and procedure of Syariah courts, which shall have jurisdiction only 
over person professing the religion of Islam and in respect only of any of the 
matters included in this paragraph, but shall not have jurisdiction in respect of 
offences except in so far as conferred by federal law[], the control of propagating 
doctrines and beliefs among persons professing the religion of Islam; the 
determination of matters of Islamic law and doctrine Malay custom.” 
 173 Hannah Beech, Malaysia‟s Crisis of Faith, TIME (Magazine), May 30, 2007, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1626300,00.html. 
 174 SOLIMAN M. SANTOS JR., THE MORO ISLAMIC CHALLENGE: CONSTITUTIONAL 
RETHINKING FOR THE MINDANAO PEACE PROCESS 13 (2001). 
 175 CONST. (1987), Pmbl., (Phil.). 
 176 SANTOS, supra note 174, at 14. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Santos notes that Islamists view the modern Western secular principle of 
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Islamic orthodoxy is contrary to the constitutional principle of the 
separation of Church and State and the provision against the 
establishment of religion.179  This concept is borrowed from the 
American model, although it is not followed dogmatically.180 
Short of a regime permitting religious autonomy and the 
implementation of religious law, such as that in Law No. 11 of 
2006 in relation to Aceh, it is difficult to broker peace and 
compromise in the face of two dueling and intransigent public 
philosophies over the source of supreme law as a basis for ordering 
social life. 
Ultimately, a clear delineation of jurisdiction between 
religious and civil courts and an indication of which is superior in 
the judicial hierarchy helps secure a peaceful co-existence, 
provided this is accepted and not used by religious entrepreneurs 
to stir up political unrest.  A case in point is the inter-relationship 
between syariah courts and the civil courts in Singapore. Here, the 
syariah court is subject to some degree of oversight by the civil 
High Court, as in the case of Mohd Ismail bin Ibrahim v. Mohd 
Taha bin Ibrahim.181  Here, the defendant-trustee had sought the 
opinion of the Fatwa Committee of Islamic Religious Council 
(“MUIS”) (which gives religious rulings) as to validity of will 
according to Muslim law under AMLA (Administration of Muslim 
Law Act).182  It found that various religious leaders from MUIS 
misconstrued the validity of a Muslim‟s will and one of them, the 
Mufti, who had validated the will as a beneficiary, had 
 
church-state separation as the root cause for the lack of morality and decline in 
spirituality in many Western / Western-oriented governments and societies. Id. at 
18. 
 179 CONST. (1987), Art. III § 5, (Phil.)   “No law shall be made respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Id.  The 1987 
Philippines Constitution also prohibits the appropriation of public money for 
religious uses and prohibits religious political parties). Id. 
 180 Id., e.g., support of military chaplains, tax exemptions, the presidential 
oath and the invocation of God in the constitutional preamble. 
 181 Mohd Ismail bin Ibrahim v. Mohd Taha bin Ibrahim, [2004] 4 S.L.R. 756; 
see also Hairani Saban Hardjoe, Hukum Faraid and the Application of AMLA as 
“The Statutory Adjunct of Muslim Law in Singapore”: Legal Reflection on the Case 
of Mohamed Ismail Bin Ibrahim v. Mohd Taha Bin Ibrahim, LAW GAZETTE, Oct. 
2006, available at http://www.lawgazette.com.sg/2006-10/default.htm. 
 182 Administration of Muslim Law Act ch. 3 (2005) (Sing.), available at 
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.pl?&actno=Reved-
3&date=latest&method=part [hereinafter AMLA]. 
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contravened the common law rule against bias.183  Justice Rubin 
noted that “[i]t is an important principle of Western as well as 
Muslim jurisprudence that a person cannot be a Justice in his own 
course” and the involvement of the Mufti who chaired the MUIS 
fatwa committee tended to “present the process in a somewhat 
lesser light.”184  In evaluating Islamic law and its four sources 
(Quran [holy text], Hadith [tradition of Prophets, oral precepts], 
Ijmaa [consensus among scholars] and Qiyas [reasoning by 
analogy]),185  Justice Rubin, a civil court Justice, adopted a 
cautious approach in evaluating expert opinion from both sides.  
For example, he took note of whether an opinion was broadly 
shared or whether there were differing viewpoints on the issue in 
assessing its weight.186 
Essentially, the High Court Justice was informing the Mufti 
and MUIS fatwa committee that they had misconstrued Islamic 
law under AMLA (as opposed to Islamic law simpliciter); thus the 
fatwa committee is not an authority unto itself.  Furthermore, 
when the counsel for MUIS said that the Mufti Tuan Isa was “not 
legally trained in civil law and is called to testify only on Muslim 
law,” this perplexed Justice Rubin.187  This is because Tuan Isa 
was distinguishing Muslim law simpliciter as opposed to Muslim 
law as regulated by AMLA as a statute enacted by the secular 
institution of Parliament.  Justice Rubin noted that AMLA was “an 
essential statutory adjunct of Muslim law in Singapore.”188  This 
indicates that religious or Islamic law is subordinate to secular law 
and that the religious courts are not applying divine law in an 
unbounded fashion, but only to the extent permitted by statute.  
This indicates the limited role of syariah courts as courts of limited 
or inferior jurisdiction, empowered to give out inheritance 
certificates setting out the fixed proportions of each legal heir.  As 
 
 183 Mohd Ismail bin Ibrahim v. Mohd Taha bin Ibrahim, [2004] 4 S.L.R. 756, 
780 ¶ 55; see also PETER CANE, INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 143-167 
(2004). 
 184 Mohd Ismail, [2004] 4 S.L.R. at 780, ¶ 55. 
 185 Id.  
 186 Id. ¶ 43 (Justice Rubin noting “I do not propose to second-guess the 
scholarship and erudition contained in the said commentary” but notes that the 
work is not a single viewpoint but rather provides “differing viewpoints of two 
well-respected shaiks (leaders).”). 
 187 Id. ¶ 63. 
 188 Id. ¶ 63. 
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the religious court was not a court of superior jurisdiction, the 
High Court in its exercise of supervisory jurisdiction was tasked 
with ensuring that the terms of Section 114 of AMLA with respect 
to testamentary disposition were observed.189  In this sense, 
secular law regulates the boundaries of sacred law. 
 
D. Multi-Religious Societies and the Agnostic State as Protector of 
Racial and Religious Minorities: Secularism, Singapore Style 
The failure to accommodate sizeable Muslim minorities of 
some ten million through reaching a just peace settlement has 
stymied the economic development of Muslim Mindanao in the 
South Philippines. There have been two failed attempts to 
negotiate peace in 1976 and 1996190 in this Catholic-majority state, 
largely owing to political corruption, poor governance and the non-
accommodation of Moro Muslims. 
In contrast, Singapore has successfully addressed the question 
of politically accommodating Muslim minorities while pursuing the 
egalitarian policy of meritocracy.  This stems from the 
apprehension of the centrality of religion and ethnicity to their 
lives, motivating the search for legal methods to incorporate these 
identities and to permit their expression in the public sphere.  
While the Singapore Constitution does not contain specific 
minority rights, Article 12 prohibits discrimination, inter alia, on 
the basis of race.191  Article 15 guarantees the religious freedom of 
persons and of religious institutions to hold property, manage their 
own affairs, and generally enjoy the communal dimensions of 
religious life.192 While there is no scheme of special privileges for 
Malays, Article 152 imposes a constitutional responsibility on the 
government to “constantly . . . care for the interests of the racial 
and religious minorities in Singapore.”193  In exercising its 
functions, the government is to “recognize the special position of 
the Malays, who are the indigenous people of Singapore, and 
 
 189 Mohd Ismail, [2004] 4 S.L.R. ¶¶ 60-65, at 781-783. 
 190 The Tripoli Agreement, Phil.-Moro National Liberation Front, Feb. 8, 2006; 
Philippines-Mindanao Peace Agreement, Phil-Moro National Liberation Front, 
Sep. 2, 1996. 
 191 SING. CONST. art. 12(2). 
 192 Id. art. 15(2)-(3). 
 193 Id. art. 152. 
44http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/2
    
2010] MINORITIES IN PLURAL DEMOCRACIES 87 
accordingly it shall be the responsibility of the government to 
protect, safeguard, support, foster, and promote their political, 
educational, religious, economic, social, and cultural interests and 
the Malay language.”194  In affirming the multicultural character of 
Singapore society, Article 153A recognizes the four official 
languages of “Malay, Mandarin, Tamil, and English,” while Malay 
is the national language.195  In addition, nothing is to prejudice the 
Government‟s right “to preserve and sustain the use and study of 
the language of any other community in Singapore.”196 
E. Statutory Facilitation of Muslim Communal Life – Pragmatic 
Secularism 
From the outset, a conscious decision was taken not to have an 
established religion: “[l]et us face up to this problem of multi-
culture, multi-religions and multi-languages. Alone in South East 
Asia, we are a State without an established church.”197  Indeed, the 
principle of religious accommodation and legal pluralism is 
constitutionally enshrined.  Article 153 provides: “The Legislature 
shall by law make provision for regulating Muslim religious affairs 
and for constituting a Council to advise the President in matters 
relating to the Muslim religion.”198 Pursuant to this, Chapter 3 of 
the Administration of Muslim Law Act (“AMLA”) was adopted. 
The Muslim community, through the Islamic Religious Council 
(“MUIS”), is statutorily empowered under the AMLA to collect 
funds for building mosques.199 Muslims enjoy the privilege of 
utilizing government machinery to aid in collections for the 
Mosque Building funds. This privilege is not extended to any other 
religious minorities, even though the Hindus have so requested. 200  
 
 194 Id. art. 152(2). 
 195 Id. art 153A. 
 196 Id. art. 153A(2)(b). 
 197 No Dominance by Religious Group over Others – Lee, STRAITS TIMES, 
(Sing.), Jan. 5, 1967, at 6. 
 198 SING. CONST. art. 153. 
 199 AMLA, supra note 182, ch. 3, pt. V, §§ 74-79. 
 200 Id. ch. 3, pt. V, § 78. Compulsory Muslim contributions towards the Mosque 
Building Fund are collected through the Central Provident Fund system pursuant 
to Section 78 of AMLA, with this concession being recognized as a “special one” 
which would “not be a precedent for other religious or ethnic groups.” Id.  It was 
not thought necessary to introduce legislation to allow donations to the Hindu 
Endowments Board to be collected through the CPF Board as “it would be no less 
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MUIS also is empowered to continue the Islamic charitable 
practice of collecting zakat to meet the social welfare needs of the 
poorer members of the community.201 
That the state is able to lend support to a religious group flows 
from its version of “accommodative secularism” and the judicial 
confirmation that the establishment, in terms of financial or non-
financial support, of a religion, is not proscribed.202  However, this 
does entail some degree of state involvement in matters related to 
religion.  For example, the President of the syariah court is 
appointed by the President of Singapore, on the advice of the 
Cabinet.203  The government also has a role in appointing up to 
seven members of the Majlis Ugama Islam (Islamic Religious 
Council, a statutory body), whose functions as stipulated in Section 
3 includes advising the Singapore President “in matters relating to 
the Muslim religion in Singapore,” and to administer related 
matters including halal certification, haj pilgrimages and religious 
schools.  MUIS focuses on helping the Muslim community to 
develop and to integrate national society, while preserving 
religious and cultural identity and practices.  Indeed, the civil 
courts in Angliss Singapore Pte, Ltd. v. Public Prosecutor204 upheld 
a conviction under Section 88 of AMLA which makes it an offence 
of strict liability for the sale of halal food, whether by a Muslim or 
non-Muslim seller, without MUIS certification and approval. 205 In 
this case, the food, “Dewfresh” chicken nuggets, was halal but 
exhibited the wrong label, which lacked MUIS approval.  In noting 
absolute liability and the fact that there was no intent to provoke 
racial discord in this case, Justice Rajah observed that “Parliament 
has deemed it fit that the religious sensitivity or welfare of the 
general public should warrant a high standard of care by all those 
engaged in the particular activities governed by statutes imposing 
 
convenient for Hindus to make their regular contributions . . . through the POSB.”  
DR. AHMAD MATTER, SING. PARL. REP. NO. 42, cols. 309-11 (Dec. 3, 1982) (noting 
contributions from Hindus for Temples, etc., and Monies from Muslims for 
Mosques, etc.). 
 201 Section 3(d) of the AMLA states that “to administer the collection of zakat 
and fitrah and other charitable contributions for the support and promotion of the 
Muslim religion or for the benefit of Muslims in accordance with this Act.” AMLA, 
supra note 182, ch. 3, pt. II, § 3(2)(d). 
 202 Chan v. Pub. Prosecutor, [1994] 3 S.L.R. 662 (Sing.). 
 203 AMLA, supra note 182, ch. 3, § 7(1)(a). 
 204 Angliss Singapore Pte, Ltd. v. Pub. Prosecutor, [2006] 4 S.L.R. 653 (Sing.). 
 205 Id. ¶¶ 29, 31. 
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strict liability,” and that “Parliament views halal certification as 
an issue of vital importance.”206  Justice Rajah also noted that 
Section 88 of AMLA only provided for individuals, rather than 
corporate entities, to be sued.  This lacuna was addressed when 
AMLA was amended in 2008 to enhance sentences for breaching 
halal regulations and to allow both individuals and corporations to 
be prosecuted.  The Muslim Affairs Minister, Yaacob Ibrahim, 
acknowledged his gratitude to Justice Rajah for his “astute 
observation and suggestion that AMLA be amended” and stated 
that “I believe every Muslim in Singapore will take comfort in 
knowing that the authorities take a serious view of a matter that is 
important to all Muslims.”207  Muslim parliamentarian Hawazi 
Daipi observed that Parliament, in amending AMLA in 2008 to 
confer upon MUIS the power to collect fines of up to SGD $2000, 
indicated the “unique role” of MUIS, the Islamic Religious Council 
of Singapore, established by statute, in a multi-racial, multi-
religious society: 
 
It is significant that while Singapore Muslims are a 
minority of the Singapore population comprising of 
approximately 14% of the population, the Bill envisages 
MUIS, a body regulating Muslim affairs, having the 
authority to fine anyone or any corporation who 
disrespects Muslims by misrepresenting halal 
certificationor breaching other matters. To me, this 
reflects the Singapore Government‟s commitment to 
fostering respect for important religious practices and 
safeguarding the interests of minorities in Singapore.208 
Thus, secular law is channeled towards realizing the concerns 
of a significant religious minority in relation to their dietary laws.  
There is no strict and dogmatic separation of religion and state in 
this respect, where the government discharges its constitutional 
responsibility under Article 152(1) to “constantly care for the 
interests of the racial and religious minorities in Singapore.”  In 
particular Article 152(2) of the Constitution provides that the 
government shall exercise its functions in a manner which 
 
 206 Id. ¶ 31, at 666.   
 207 YAACOB IBRAHIM, 85 SING. PARL. REP. NO. 85 (Nov. 17, 2008), available at 
http://www.parliament.gov.sg./Publications/sprs.htm. 
 208 Id. 
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recognizes “the special position of the Malays” as Singapore‟s 
indigenous peoples, and thereby the government is “to protect, 
safeguard, support, foster and promote their political, educational, 
religious, economic, social and cultural interests and the Malay 
language.”  It does so through its accommodative approach towards 
enforcing standards protecting Muslim dietary laws.209 
 
 In contrast, the Philippines adopted the American doctrine of 
the “separation of church and state.”210  In the 2003 decision of 
Islamic Da‟Wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of Muslim 
Affairs,211 the Supreme Court declared that halal certification 
could not be done by a government agency as this would entail 
having a government body rule on religious matters, i.e., being 
involved in a religious function.212  They rejected an argument that 
 
 209 AMLA also permits polygamy, contrary to the general norm of monogamy 
enshrined in the Woman‟s Charter (Ch. 353).  These gender inegalitarian norms 
had to be subject to insulation from the application of the Convention for the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) which 
Singapore acceded to in 1995.  Singapore attached a reservation stating: “In the 
context of Singapore's multi-racial and multi-religious society and the need to 
respect the freedom of minorities to practise their religious and personal laws, the 
Republic of Singapore reserves the right not to apply the provisions of articles 2 
and 16 where compliance with these provisions would be contrary to their 
religious or personal laws.” CONVENTION FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (CEDAW), RESERVATIONS AND DECLARATIONS 
(2001), available at http://www.bayefsky.com/html/singapore_t2_cedaw.php. See 
generally Li-ann Thio, She‟s a Woman, But She Acts Very Fast, in MIXED 
BLESSINGS: LAW, RELIGIONS, AND WOMEN‟S RIGHTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 241-
77 (Amanda Whiting & Carolyn Evans eds., 2006); Li-ann Thio, The Impact of 
Internationalization on Domestic Governance: The Transformative Potential of 
CEDAW, 1 SING. J.  INT‟L & COMP. L., 278, 278-350 (1997). 
 210 CONST. (1987), Art. II, (Phil.) available at http://www.lawphil. 
net/consti/cons1987.html. Section 6, Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution 
provides that “[t]he separation of the Church and State shall be inviolable.”  Id. 
 211 Islamic Da‟Wah Coucil Phil., Inc., v. Office Executive Sec‟y President Phil., 
G.R. No. 153888 (Jul. 9, 2003). (Phil.), available at 
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/jul2003/gr_ 153888_2003.html.  The 
Office of Muslim Affairs or OMA was created by Executive Order No. 697 in 1981 
“to ensure the integration of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino 
society with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions, and institutions.” Id. 
OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim 
community as a “national cultural community” and not as a religious group. Id. 
Given the principle of separation of Church and State extant in the Philippines, 
the state must ensure the OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest 
it violate the non-establishment clause and the “free exercise of religion” provision 
found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. Id. 
 212 Id. “Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious 
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the state was validly exercising its police powers in protecting 
Filipinos‟ “right to health and to instill health consciousness in 
them.”213  The Court agreed with the petitioner‟s contention that 
“[i]t is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies 
and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said 
scheme is a function only [of] religious organizations, entity or 
scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.”214  
Clearly, some of the statutory functions of Singapore‟s MUIS would 
contravene the Philippines‟ doctrine of the “separation of church 
and state.” Thus, the Singapore model of secularism is not 
dogmatic or doctrinaire, but pragmatic. 
F. Equality of Opportunity and Meritocracy for Religious Minorities  
Sufficient political and cultural space has been accorded to 
Muslim minorities, who are predominantly Malay, to identify with 
Singapore‟s economic success rather than to resent it.215  The policy 
of meritocracy centers around ensuring equal access to education, 
such that success is predicated on merit, rather than on ethno-
religious identity.  Muslim students, like students of any other 
faith, may excel and enjoy the social mobility that accompanies it. 
On the contrary, it has been observed that educational 
institutions catering to Muslims in the autonomous regions in the 
Philippines are comparatively deficient, given the poor quality of 
educators, particularly in relation to English language 
 
function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur‟an and Islamic 
beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 
46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein 
petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim 
consumption.  Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, 
the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the 
Qur‟an and Sunnah on halal food.” Id. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Tackling Unrest in Thai South: S'pore Offers 
Examples for Inter-faith Relations, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Jul. 20, 2008, available 
at http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp?View,7758; Speech, Prime Minister 
Lee Hsien Loong, Mendaki's 25th Anniversary Dinner and Awards Presentation 
(Sept. 2, 2007), transcript available at 
http://www.pmo.gov.sg/News/Speeches/Prime+Minister/Speech+by+PM+Lee+at+
Mendakis+25th+Anniversary+Dinner+and+Awards+Presentation.htm (detailing 
achievements of Malay community). 
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proficiency,216 which translates into unequal educational 
opportunities. Consequently, many Moros are unable to pass the 
national civil service examination, which means less access to 
employment opportunities.  This hinders both poverty alleviation 
and economic development in the autonomous areas.  In terms of 
the private sector, the perception that Catholics are favored over 
Muslims generates a “victim” mentality amongst Muslims.217 
The Singapore government treads a fine line in seeking to 
reconcile the cultural needs of the Malay Muslim minority with 
those of national objectives.  For example, the government plan to 
require compulsory primary education under the Compulsory 
Education Act (Chapter 51) was criticized as a threat to madrasahs 
(Islamic religious schools), and therefore to Muslim religious and 
cultural activity.218  The fear was that the real intention was to 
eliminate the last bastion of autonomous Islamic activity in 
Singapore.  To allay these fears, the government struck a 
compromise by exempting madrasahs from the statutory regime.  
Madrasahs are an important source of cultural identity and 
producer of future religious leaders. However, madrasahs were 
still subject to minimal educational standards and national 
primary school examinations, designed to ensure the future 
employability of its graduates.219  Thus, the government does 
 
 216 The English language proficiency of many teachers in the Autonomous 
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) is equivalent to that of Grade 2 and 3 
students in public elementary schools nationwide. Only 5 per cent of all teachers 
in the region are qualified to teach, according to a study conducted by the United 
States Agency for International Development. Taharudin Piang Ampatuan et al., 
Ensuring a Thriving Community, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), June 28, 2008, available 
at  
http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/ICPVTRinNews/Ensuring%20a%20thriving%20communit
y.pdf. 
 217 Ampatuan et al., supra note 216. 
 218 See Press Release, PERGAS, Pergas‟ Stand on Compulsory Education, 
(Mar. 31, 2000), available at http://www.pergas.org.sg/Resources PRleases.htm. 
See generally Lily Zubaidah Rahim, Governing Islam and Regulating Muslims in 
Singapore‟s Secular Authoritarian State (Asia Research Centre, Murdoch Univ., 
Working Paper No. 156, 2009), available at 
http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/wp/wp156.pdf. 
 219 Mukhlis Abu Bakar, Between State Interests and Citizen Rights: Whither 
the Madrasah, in SECULARISM AND SPIRITUALITY: SEEKING INTEGRATED KNOWLEDGE 
AND SUCCESS IN MADRASAH EDUCATION IN SINGAPORE 29 (Noor Aisha Abdul 
Rahman & Lai Ah Eng eds., 2006). See also Tan Tey Keong, Social Capital and 
State-Civil Society Relations in Singapore 1, 1 n.3 (Nat‟l Univ. of Sing. & Adjunct 
Fellow Inst. of Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 9, 2001), available at 
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retain some supervisory oversight over religious schools while 
preserving a degree of cultural and religious autonomy for a 
religious institution sufficient to placate a concerned minority.220 
Even where serious public health issues are concerned, the 
Singapore Government, acting consistently with its Article 152 
obligation, has demonstrated sensitivity towards Muslim concerns 
in the field of human organ transplants and even the burial of 
Muslim SARs (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) victims during 
the 2003 crisis.  Muslims were granted an exception to SARs 
control measures of cremating victims by being allowed immediate 
burial in two sealed body bags.221  In protecting the interests of the 
Muslim community, Muslims are given privileged treatment 
through policies such as the government sponsored “one mosque 
per town” program.222  This pragmatic secularism, unlike the 
stricter separationist model practiced in the Philippines, is not 
constitutionally barred as links between state and religious 
institutions and are not precluded by a “establishment‟ clause.  
Chief Justice Yong, in Colin Chan v. Public Prosecutor, noted that 
“the Singapore Constitution does not prohibit the “establishment of 
any religion,” which relates to providing financial or non-pecuniary 
support for a religion, as the Singapore government does in 
relation to Islam.223 
While seeking to be neutral between religions, the government 
appreciates the close conflation in fact between race and religion 
(Malay and Islam) and is solicitous towards protecting Malays and 
their sensitivities in the interest of social harmony. For example, 
 
http://www. spp.nus.edu.sg/ips/docs/publications/wp9.pdf. 
 220 Bakar, supra note 219, at 36-48. 
 221 Jane Lee, No Wakes for Suspected SARs Deaths, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), 
Apr. 24, 2003, at H4. 
 222 See Press Release, Encik Othman Wok, Minister of Social Affairs, 
Ministerial Statement on the Increase in the Rate of Mosque Building Fund 
Contributions in Parliament (June 29, 1977), available at http://stars. 
nhb.gov.sg/stars/tmp/ow19770629s.pdf. "The Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 
supports the policy of the Government in building one new mosque in each new 
town where the Muslim population is sufficiently large and agrees that this is the 
most practical way to meet the religious needs of the Muslims as they are 
resettled in the new towns." Id. This is funded through the Mosque Building Fund 
Scheme whereby employers are required to pay a small contribution per Muslim 
employee per month to the fund and recover this from their Muslim employee 
wages. See id. 
 223 Colin Chan v. Pub. Prosecutor, [1994] 3 S.L.R. 662, 681 (Sing.). 
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in 2005, two bloggers224 were charged under Section 4(1)(a) of the 
Sedition Act (Chapter 290) with anti-Muslim posts, as these were 
acts with a “seditious tendency” defined in Section 3(1)(e) as an act 
“to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races 
or classes of the population in Singapore.”225  Senior District 
Justice Richard Magnus noted the appropriateness of a custodial 
sentence for such offences given “the special sensitivity of racial 
and religious issues in our multi-cultural society.”226  He alluded 
not only to the “current domestic and international security 
climate,”227 but to the 1964 race riots and the Maria Hertogh 
incident in the 1950s.228  Senior District Justice Magnus 
underscored how “callous and reckless remarks on racial or 
religious subjects [could] cause social disorder [in] whatever 
medium or forum they are expressed, [including the Internet with] 
its ubiquitous reach.”229  He noted: 
 
The virtual reality of cyberspace is generally unrefereed. But 
one cannot hide behind the anonymity of cyberspace, as each 
accused has done, to pen diatribes against another race or 
religion.  The right to propagate an opinion on the Internet is 
not, and cannot, be an unfettered right.  The right of one 
person‟s freedom of expression must always be balanced by the 
right of another‟s freedom from offence, and tampered by wider 
public interest considerations.  It is only appropriate social 
behaviour, independent of any legal duty, of every Singapore 
citizen and resident to respect the other races in view of our 
multi-racial society.  Each individual living here irrespective of 
his racial origin owes it to himself and to the country to see 
that nothing is said or done which might incite the people and 
plunge the country into racial strife and violence. These are 
basic ground rules. A fortiori, the Sedition Act statutorily 
 
 224 Pub. Prosecutor v. Koh Song Huat Benjamin, [2005] S.G.D.C. 272 (Sing.) 
[hereinafter Benjamin]. 
 225 Id.  Notably, in 2006, a person who posted an offensive cartoon of Jesus 
Christ on his blog received a „stern warning.‟ Zakir Hussain, Blogger Who Posted 
Cartoons of Christ Online Being Investigated, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), June 14, 
2008, available at http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article-
southeastasia.asp?parentid=49563. 
 226 Benjamin, [2005] S.G.D.C. at 272, ¶ 6. 
 227 Id. ¶ 6. 
 228 In Re Maria Huberdina Hertogh v. Amina Binte Mohamed, [1951] 1 M.L.J. 
12 (Sing.). 
 229 Benjamin, [2005] S.G.D.C. at 272, ¶ 7. 
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delineates this redline on the ground in the subject at hand. 
Otherwise, the resultant harm is not only to one racial group 
but to the very fabric of our society.230 
Senior District Justice Magnus noted that seditious speech 
threatened to harm not only a sector of the community (“one racial 
group”) but the nation at large (the “very fabric of our society”).231  
He took judicial notice of the importance of “basic ground rules,” 
the unwritten or informal rules of our “social constitution” which 
fashion how we exercise our rights, which invariably entail some 
responsibilities.232  These social duties, distinct from legal duties, 
inhere in every citizen and resident, obliging them “to respect the 
other races in view of our multi-racial society,” to ensure “that 
nothing is said or done which might incite the people and plunge 
the country into racial strife and violence.”233 Although such social 
norms should be implicitly understood, Senior District Justice 
Magnus felt the need to articulate these expressly, particularly to 
the younger generation of Singaporeans with “short memories”234 
who lacked an appreciation of how provoking racial and religious 
sensitivities can threaten social harmony.  A sense of duty is 
bolstered by an understanding of history. 
These prosecutions have been characterized as “an example of 
our commitment to multi-racial cohesion,” while acknowledging 
that elsewhere “such prosecution could be considered as 
infringement of freedom of expression.”235  Free speech 
jurisprudence is thus context-based and limits are placed where 
these threaten racial and religious harmony, which are considered 
key components of the rule of law.236  Unlike a society with a 
homogenous population “with settled customs and expectations 
[where] social responsibility . . . is enforced by peer pressure, non-
homogenous societies face unique challenges.”237  The rule of law 
 
 230 Id. ¶ 8. 
 231 Id. ¶ 8. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. ¶ 6. 
 235 Shunmugam Jayakumar, Keynote Address at the IBA Rule of Law 
Symposium: The Meaning and Importance of the Rule of Law (Oct. 19, 2007), 
transcript available at http://app2.mlaw.gov.sg/News/tabid/204/ctgy/Speech/ 
currentpage/5/Default.aspx?ItemId=141. 
 236 Benjamin, [2005] SGDC at 171, ¶ 18. 
 237 Id. ¶ 17. 
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makes expectations “transparent” and reduces the friction arising 
from social interaction.  The government position is that 
“[h]armony in a diverse society cannot be achieved with a laissez-
faire system; or the different ethnic, religious, cultural and 
language groups will have their own song sheet and the 
government as conductor will not produce harmony.”238 
By treating all religions as equal and allowing them to 
flourish, rather than imposing any one, the Muslim community 
sees value and benefit in Singapore‟s model of quasi-secularism, 
and its policies of multi-racialism and multi-culturalism.  This 
acceptance of the system has allowed the government to unify a 
diverse society.  An environment of civil peace between ethnic or 
religious groups helps to foster mutual accommodation, whereas 
conflict heightens difference and hinders human development. 
 
G. The 2007 Thai Constitution: Buddhism as an Official Religion? 
One of the proposals associated with the drafting of the new 
Thai Constitution was that of enumerating Buddhism as a 
national religion, since it is a core component of Thai national 
identity.239  Although almost 95% of the sixty-five million Thais 
profess Buddhism as their religion and the King has always, in 
fact, been a Buddhist, Thailand is a secular state, although leading 
commentators consider that Buddhism is the “implied” state 
religion.240  This issue was raised during the drafting of the 1997 
Constitution, but the decision taken was to preserve the status quo 
of constitutional secularism, an official indifference to religion 
while recognizing religious freedom, to avoid offending other 
religious communities and causing social division.241 
The Constitution Drafting Assembly (“CDA”), appointed by the 
 
 238 Id.  
 239 See BUDDHA DHARMA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Buddhism in Thailand 
(2002), http://www.buddhanet.net/pdf_file/ buddhinthai.pdf; Duncan McCargo, 
Buddhism, Democracy and Identity in Thailand, 11 ROUTLEDGE 155 (2004). 
 240 Vitit Muntarbhorn, Human Rights in the Era of “Thailand Inc.,” in HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDY OF TWELVE ASIAN 
JURISDICTIONS, FRANCE AND THE USA 328 (Randall Peerenboom et al. eds., 
2006). 
 241 Andrew Harding, Buddhism: Human Rights and Constitutional Reform in 
Thailand, 2 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 5 n.17 (2007). 
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military junta which seized power in September 2006, voted in 
June 2007 (by sixty-six to nineteen vote) not to include 
Buddhism.242  The governing fear was that, owing to the sensitivity 
of religion and given that there was no precedent for an official 
religion, including a reference to Buddhism might prove divisive, 
even where Buddhists enjoy an overwhelming majority.  This is 
because naming a national religion could be seen as an oppressive 
assimilationist measure by the Thais in the under-developed 
Muslim-majority south which has experienced an insurgency since 
2005.243  This could inflame the conflict.  There, Islamic law applies 
with respect to family matters, administered by religious courts.  
The state also provides funding in an effort to integrate Muslim 
minorities into Buddhist and Muslim educational institutions, and 
provides funds for religious education programs in public and 
private schools.244  It also provides daily allowances for Buddhists 
and Muslims holding senior ecclesiastical and administrative 
posts.245  An outstanding issue which remains to be settled is 
whether to permit the establishment of religious schools that teach 
Islam. The views over this issue are polarized, ranging from the 
desire to respect cultural diversity to the fear that such schools 
would be venues for dissent, radicalism and even terrorism. 
The preamble to the 2007 draft Constitution states that it 
contains significant principles, including that of “upholding all 
religions” and references the Buddhist era.246  The supremacy of 
 
 242 Thai Charter Drafters Reject Buddhism as National Religion, YAHOO! NEWS 
/ AFP, Jun. 30 2007, http://pluralism.org/news/view/16773. 
 243 When Siam took control over Pattani in South Thailand under the Anglo-
Siamese Treaty of 1909, it took coercive steps to weaken Islamic identity and to 
strengthen a mono-ethnic Buddhist populace.  Local rulers were replaced by Thai 
rulers, Islamic schools were closed and around World War Two, men were 
required to wear western-style trousers, Muslims were prevented from adopting 
Muslim names or using the Malay dialect and shariah law was replaced by 
Buddhist laws of marriage and inheritance, generating resentment. The Pattani 
separatist movement following World War Two is an attempt by a Muslim Malay 
minority with a distinct cultural identity and lifestyle, to throw off a government 
which imposed a dominant Buddhist Thai culture. Andrew Forbes, Thailand‟s 
Muslim Minorities: Assimilation, Secession or Coexistence?, ASIAN SURVEY 38, 
1056-73 (May 1982). 
 244 Prashanth Parameswaran, Islamic Education as a Peacemaking Tool: A 
Case Study of Southern Thailand, GLOBAL POL., Oct. 16, 2007,  http://www.global-
politics.co.uk/issue4/Parameswaran/. 
 245 Harding, supra note 241, at 11. 
 246 THAIL. CONST. pmbl., available at http://www.asianlii.org/th/legis/ 
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the Constitution is affirmed (Chapter I, Section 6) and following 
past Constitutions, Chapter II Section 9 provides that “[t]he King 
is a Buddhist and Upholder of religions.”247  It contains no minority 
or group rights as such, though it recognizes the right of “[p]ersons 
assembling to be a community” as having the right to conserve 
their customs and culture and participate in the management of 
natural resources and the environment.248  This appears to be 
directed at indigenous groups and such communities that can sue 
government agencies to vindicate these environmentally oriented 
community rights. 
Religious freedom of individuals is thus safeguarded by 
Section 37, which provides that: 
 
A person shall enjoy full liberty to profess a religion, a 
religious denomination or creed, and observe religious precepts 
or commandments or exercise a form of worship in accordance 
with his belief; provided that it is not contrary to his civic 
duties, public order or good morals.249 
In exercising the liberty referred to in paragraph one, a person 
shall be protected from any act of the State, which is derogatory to 
his rights or detrimental to his due benefits on the grounds of 
professing a religion, a religious denomination or creed or 
observing religious precepts or commandments or exercising a 
form of worship in accordance with his different belief from that of 
others. 
All Thais, irrespective of religion, enjoy equal protection under 
the Constitution.250  Interestingly, it is a constitutional duty of 
every person to uphold “religions”251 and a state obligation under 
Chapter V (Directive Principles of Fundamental State Policies) 
Part V, Section 79, to protect religions, especially Buddhism, 
(which is the only religion named in the Constitution) as a source 
of civic virtue and to ensure inter-religious harmony.252  There are 
 
const/2007/1.html. 
 247 Id. ch. II, § 9. 
 248 Id. ch. III, pt. 12, § 66. 
 249 Id. ch. III, pt. 3, § 37. 
 250 Id. ch. I, § 5. The Thai people, irrespective of their origins, sexes or 
religions, shall enjoy equal protection under this Constitution. 
 251 Id. ch. IV, § 70. 
 252 THAIL. CONST.  ch. V, § 79. The State shall patronize and protect Buddhism 
as the religion observed by most Thais for a long period of time and other 
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specific provisions relating to Buddhist clergy, such as their 
disenfranchisement on election day.253  Such provisions were all 
present in the 1997 Constitution.  While this disenfranchisement 
clause may appear prima facie to be discriminatory, as it does not 
apply to other religions; this provision in fact reflects the special 
position of Buddhism within the Thai constitutional order insofar 
as the apex law considers that Buddhism does not permit its 
adherents to be politically partisan. The principle of religious 
disqualification actually upholds a central Buddhist tenet that 
clergy not be involved in earthly affairs, given the focus of 
Buddhism on attaining karma to achieve nirvana (release from 
earthly suffering). In other words, a Buddhist tenet trumps a 
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom and non-
discrimination on the basis of religion. 
The move to identify Buddhism as the national religion 
reflects a strain of Buddhist nationalism and a possible decline in 
the policy of religious tolerance, if such nationalism turns against 
minority faiths.  Buddhist activists were motivated by a fear that 
Buddhism was under siege, given the attacks by the 1.3 million 
ethnic Malay Muslims in the separatist south against Buddhist 
clergy and buildings.254  Indeed, reportedly, entire Buddhist 
communities had fled to escape brutal violence.255  It was thought 
that the official recognition of Buddhism was necessary to ensure it 
continues the country‟s main religion. 
As a cautionary tale, some Buddhists argue against raising the 
status of Buddhism through the Constitution, pointing to the 
negative effects of the successful parallel effort to constitutionally 
enshrine Buddhism in Sri Lanka, a country mired in civil 
conflict.256 The mixture of Buddhism and nationalism is a 
 
religions, promote good understanding and harmony among followers of all 
religions as well as encourage the application of religious principles to create 
virtue and develop the quality of life. Id. 
 253 Id. ch. VI, pt. II, § 100. 
 254 Doug Bandow, A Buddhist Threat to Religious Freedom?, 
FRONTPAGEMAGAZINE.COM, Sept. 10, 2007, 
http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=28029. 
 255 Seth Mydans, Thais Struggle with Violent Insurgency, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/26/world/asia/26 
thailand.html. 
 256 Article 9 of the Sri Lankan Constitution accords the “foremost place” to 
Buddhism. See SRI LANKA CONST. ch. 2, § 9, available at http://www.priu. 
gov.lk/Cons/1978Constitution/Chapter_02_Amd.html. 
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dangerous mix in Sri Lanka and illustrates how, when a religious 
group gains political power, it may pursue a discriminatory agenda 
against minority faiths.257  The problem with enthroning an official 
religion, the religion of the majority, is that this might be seen as a 
threat to religious minorities and the ascription to them of second-
class citizenship; this divides, rather than unites.  By promoting 
the rights of minorities, e.g., through the education system, the 
government could undercut accusations that it is seeking to 
undermine Islamic culture and in that way facilitate a peaceful 
resolution of a tragic situation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
To accommodate racial and religious minorities in a society, 
attention needs to be paid both to constitutional and non-
constitutional solutions, to ensure the protection of the identity 
and culture of minorities, their effective participation in 
government, and economic development within the framework of 
national unity.  There is no uniform “one size fits all solution,” as 
institutions must fit the needs of the demos, taking into account 
their history and other contextual factors.  However, certain 
measures should be avoided in the interests of ethno-religious 
pluralism and social stability.  Forcible assimilation and repressive 
measures against minority groups, utilizing the “tools of coercion” 
left behind by colonial rulers in Asia and Africa, which made 
political leaders “careless of cultivating the consent of the ruled,”258 
will only exacerbate conflict and thwart the forging of a durable 
peace. 
Culture precedes institutions.  Thus, an ethos of racial and 
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religious tolerance, if not a celebration of racial and religious 
diversity as a strength, is a form of unity in diversity united by a 
common sense of citizenship and political ideals, and a necessary 
partner in producing just peace in divided societies.  A sense of 
security, of having a stake, is necessary to inculcate a sense of 
commitment to the polity.  Constitutionalism is closely related to 
the process of value formation.  Representative democratic 
institutions send a signal of political inclusivity that can help in 
the continuing efforts to build democratic values, such as respect 
for individual and group freedoms, civic virtues, and 
communitarian attitudes on which strong foundations of durable 
institutions must rest, towards the public value of securing an 
ordered liberty.  In the final analysis, one central factor in judging 
the quality of a country‟s civilized governance must reside in how it 
treats its minorities. 
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